Disproportional Representation: A Mixed Methods Analysis of Educational Attainment Representation in State Government by Neiman, Jayme l
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Political Science Department -- Theses,
Dissertations, and Student Scholarship Political Science, Department of
Summer 6-24-2014
Disproportional Representation: A Mixed
Methods Analysis of Educational Attainment
Representation in State Government
Jayme l. Neiman
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscitheses
Part of the American Politics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Department -- Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Neiman, Jayme l., "Disproportional Representation: A Mixed Methods Analysis of Educational Attainment Representation in State
Government" (2014). Political Science Department -- Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship. 31.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscitheses/31
 
 
Disproportional Representation: A Mixed Methods Analysis of Educational Attainment 
Representation in State Government 
 
by 
 
Jayme Neiman 
 
A Dissertation 
 
Presented to the Faculty of  
The Graduate College of the University of Nebraska 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Major: Political Science 
 
Under the Supervision of Professor Kevin B. Smith 
 
 
Lincoln, Nebraska 
June, 2014 
  
 
 
 
 
Disproportional Representation: A Mixed Methods Analysis of Educational Attainment 
Representation in State Government 
Jayme Neiman, Ph.D. 
University of Nebraska, 2014 
Advisor: Kevin B. Smith 
 
The present dissertation examines unequal political representation in the 
United States. More specifically, I ask whether American citizens with low 
relative levels of education are under-represented by their state governments 
compared to their well-educated counterparts. I posit that this question is vital to 
our understanding of the quality of democracy in America. 
 In order to answer the primary question, I take a mixed-methods approach, 
using a combination of quantitative and qualitative data to obtain a clearer picture 
of the representation scene. In the quantitative chapters, I demonstrate that in 
terms of both service responsiveness and policy responsiveness, those individuals 
with less education are not being appropriately represented. Additionally, I 
interviewed legislators from around the country to gain insight into how they 
perceive their representativeness. This adds depth and a more personal angle to 
the quantitative studies. 
 I take additional steps to examine wither the education levels of the 
legislators themselves affects their representation of less-educated constituents. 
Not only is legislator education an area that has not been often studied, I use an 
original data set of state legislator educational attainment that provides the most 
extensive look at this topic that, to my knowledge, has ever been conducted. 
           Finally, I conclude by relating this work back to that on state politics and 
inequality and by highlighting a series of policy recommendations addressing 
issues in civic education and participation, and the weighting of citizen political 
interests in the policymaking process. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction, Theoretical Background, and 
Dissertation Overview 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Government responsiveness to constituents’ political desires is an essential part of 
representative democracy. The belief in popular sovereignty—as Abraham Lincoln 
put it, that government should be “of the people, by the people, for the people”— is a 
guiding principle of American governance.  
Given its integral place in democratic theory, it is not surprising that political 
scientists have devoted considerable effort and resources to the study of political 
representation. There is a massive literature examining representation and its 
elements and influences, including voter turnout, ideological consistency, political 
knowledge, and public opinion (e.g. Althaus 2002; Converse 1964; Popkin 1994). 
Political representation is omnipresent in political science research because “in the 
end, the link between public opinion and government policy is one of the things that 
democracy is all about” (Flavin 2010, 2). 
One of the things this research teaches us is that not all people are equally 
represented.  Influence over the system is disproportionately held by the 
socioeconomic elite—policymakers are disproportionately chosen and influenced by 
those with higher socio-economic status (Ansolabehere and Snyder 1999; Verba et al. 
1995). While income and occupation certainly play a role, political scientists have 
consistently argued that education is the most influential determinant of political 
participation (e.g. Campbell 2009; Kam and Palmer 2008, 2011; Wolfinger and 
2 
 
 
 
Rosenstone 1980). It follows, then, that if the more educated voters are likeliest to 
play a role in determining their reelection chances, rational policymakers should be 
attentive to their interests. But what of less educated citizens? If the less educated 
participate less and also have distinct policy preferences, are those interests 
meaningfully attended to when lawmakers have less electoral incentive to pay 
attention to them?  
The answer to this question is not clear. The extant research agrees that less 
education means a lower likelihood of participation, but this does not mean an 
absence of participation. Some people with low education do participate, and public 
policy inarguably affects citizens with low education. Unfortunately, we know very 
little about voters with low levels of education who participate and to what extent 
lawmakers are responsive to them and their interests.  In order to help fill this gap, 
this dissertation addresses one primary research question: How responsive are elected 
governments to the interests of less educated voters? 
This dissertation examines this question on two different levels. The first is at an 
individual level, examining how responsive individual policy makers are to 
individuals with low education levels who participate. This portion of the dissertation 
seeks to fill a notable gap in the literature on representation--there is no extant 
systematic research on how elected officials respond to citizens with low levels of 
education. 
The dissertation also examines representation at a macro policy level by looking 
at the policies of states to see whether their content systematically correlates with the 
proportion of population that is less educated. The extent to which policy content 
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reflects the interest of lower educated citizens will provide insight into how those 
interests are being represented in democratic policymaking. Socioeconomic status, 
especially educational attainment, is closely related to economic need. Education 
levels are strongly correlated with the types of policy benefits important to low 
socioeconomic status: healthcare, welfare, and unemployment benefits, for example. 
If individuals with relatively low amounts of education are not participating in 
politics, or are not being heard when they do attempt to participate, elite decisions in 
these areas may necessarily be biased against those who are actually using the 
programs (Berinsky 2002; Hill and Leighley 1992; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-
Andersson 1995; Verba et al. 1995; Ringquist, Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 
1997). Governments do not move on issues that may be salient to certain groups of 
people because they are unable to turn their private needs into political demands or 
are even aware that they have a problem (Stone 2002).  
1.2 Education and Political Inequality 
Many studies have found that those who participate in politics in the United States 
are not particularly representative of the total population. Notably, individuals who 
participate tend to be better off and better educated (Bendix and Lipset 1966; Brady et al. 
1995; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Verba et al. 1995; Wright 1985).  This raises a question of 
what interests representatives will actually represent, either on an individual level or 
collectively as embodied in public policy. Elected officials clearly have the choice to be 
more or less representative of different groups of their constituents. This study examines 
these choices by looking at responsiveness to constituent communication and policy 
outcomes. 
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Research indicates that education is the single best predictor of political 
participation (Brady et al. 1995; Verba et al. 1995). A plethora of studies find that 
education correlates positively with political participation, or in other words, uneducated 
people are less likely to participate than relatively more educated ones (Nie et al. 1996; 
Rosenstone and Hansen 2003; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980). Indeed, Verba et al. (1995) find that “educational attainment is, in 
fact, the single most potent predictor of an adult’s political activity” (p. 13).  
This relationship has typically been accounted for by the assumption that 
education provides certain benefits to those who have it, and that those benefits aid in the 
motivation and ability to participate. This has been broken down further in different 
studies. For example, education may confer individuals with organizational and 
communication abilities (Verba et al. 1995), political knowledge (Almond and Verba 
1989), interest (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), civic duty and efficacy (Campbell et al. 
1960), or enhanced or higher- level job opportunities (Nie et al. 1996). Though the debate 
on why education is so strongly linked to participation is far from resolved (see Kam and 
Palmer 2008 for an overview), no one seriously disputes education’s role as an important 
influence on political participation.   
Education’s preeminent role in driving participation is important because of its 
implications for representation to a large section of the American electorate. Though 
education levels have increased over the past 60 years, there remains a significant portion 
of the population with relatively low education levels. As of the 2010 census, 6.1% of 
Americans have less than a 9th grade education, 8.3% have more than 9th grade but less 
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than a high school diploma, and 28.5% has only a high school degree (United States 
Census Bureau 1).  
Education level is clearly linked to socioeconomic and political opportunity. For 
example, higher levels of education are negatively correlated with unemployment (r=-
.204, p=.000) (United States Census Bureau 1), most Americans who do not have health 
insurance (63%) do not have a college degree (United States Census Bureau (2)), and the 
poverty rate for those without a college degree is more than six times higher than for 
those with a college degree (United States Census Bureau 1). These relationships 
highlight the specific issues that may be of particular salience to those individuals with 
relatively low levels of education and give us some clues as to policy issue areas where 
we ought to be looking for underrepresentation.  
Political participation enables individuals to influence the governmental process 
through communication of preferences, contributes to trust in government through 
casework, and provides an overall platform for representativeness (Brady et al. 1995; 
Verba et al. 1995; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Schlozman and Verba 1979). Particularly at 
the state level, where there are fewer mechanisms like opinion polls to aggregate interests 
on specific issues, more direct forms of communication between constituents and 
legislators are the main gauges of public feeling on any given issue (Herbst 1998).  
It is clear that political participation is an important part of representation in the 
American form of democracy. Verba et al. (1995) posit that “political participation 
affords citizens in a democracy an opportunity to communicate information to 
government officials about their concerns and preferences and to put pressure on them to 
respond” (p.37). Research indicates that the interests represented in government are the 
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interests of those who participate (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Erickson, 
Mackuen, and Stimson 2002; Jones and Baumgartner 2004). This may be especially true 
of state level governance, with the relative dearth of opinion polling, which raises 
additional issues. Schattschneider (1960) warned that low participation would produce 
biases between the larger population and those who are actually being represented.  
Though his point was a more general one, systematic variation in access to the 
governmental system through participation is thus an important factor in understanding 
differences in representation.  
There is some evidence of this is the empirical literature. A 2005 study by James 
Avery and Mark Peffley found that states where lower socioeconomic status voters had 
higher rates of turnout during elections, lawmakers were less likely to pass highly 
restrictive welfare eligibility laws (Avery and Peffley 2005). A series of studies in the 
1990s by Hill, Leighley and their colleagues similarly found that an electorate with an 
upper SES bias tended to be associated with less-generous welfare benefit policies. These 
findings are consistent with Schattschneider’s warning, and though they speak more to an 
income-related class bias, the principles can be easily transferred to the area of 
educational attainment. 
The general findings on education, participation, and representation thus raise 
some troubling questions for pluralist notions of representative democracy. Pluralist 
theory posits that the ability to influence government is widely dispersed. In the pluralist 
framework cohesive interest groups form whenever there is contention over key values, 
and those interest groups seek representation by lobbying government to produce an 
outcome favorable to them. This theory assumes that the ability to do this is distributed 
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throughout society, largely available to everyone (Dahl 1956, 1960, 1961, 1989). 
Schattschneider (1960), however, points out that “the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that 
the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent” (p. 34-35). He is asserting 
that some groups, specifically the advantaged ones, have more power than others. Thus, it 
is logical that the poorly educated, not tending to be particularly upper-class, may be 
facing systematic disadvantages in terms of access to and influence over the political 
system. 
Of course there exist groups that have typically been disadvantaged and 
underrepresented in the past that have, at least to some extent, overcome these barriers. 
For example, blacks, women, homosexuals, the elderly, and the disabled have all made 
strides toward greater representation in recent decades, partially through their own 
initiative and partially through others lobbying on their behalves (Gilmour and Lamb 
1975; Kazin 2011), but the uneducated have not.  Certainly the fact that many of the 
barriers that these groups have had to face were institutional ones contributes to the ways 
in which they have been able to make this progress, makes the study of a group (the 
uneducated) that is not necessarily facing institutional barriers particularly interesting. 
One possible factor unique to groups such as the uneducated is lack of group 
cohesion. Karl Marx asserted that workers would only be able to overcome their 
subjugation when they are aware of their common bonds of oppression and are ready to 
act together (Marx 1904). Schlozman and Verba (1979) applied this principle to the 
unemployed during the recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and it seems to be an 
apt description of the uneducated as well. Verba et al. discuss the idea that lack of 
communication between members of these “groups”, reluctance to believe that associated 
8 
 
 
 
problems are relevant to government intervention and efficacy may all be involved in this 
lack of cohesion. In terms of those with lower education levels such as a high school 
diploma or lower), we must also take into consideration the possibility that basic 
knowledge levels restrict the ability of many of these individuals to interact with their 
government in a fruitful way (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992; Althaus 2002; Popkin 1994).  
 
1.3 Political Representation 
 Political representation is one of the more widely studied topics in political science. 
From Dahl (1956, 1961, 1971) to Downs (1971) to Mansbridge (2003), scholars have 
conceptualized and tested theories of representation. One of the more recognized of the 
works on political representation is Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) The Concept of Representation. 
In this work, Pitkin asserts that it is the responsibility of an elected official to act “in the 
interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (p. 209). Basically, a legisla tor 
should not act solely according to his or her own preferences, but is instead obligated to 
communicate with his or her constituents and allow them to communicate meaningfully in 
return. 
In her book, Pitkin identifies four concepts of representation. The first conception 
of representation is formalistic, which refers to the specific institutional structures that 
spark and foster representation. Formalistic representation can be further broken down 
into authorization, or how a representative obtains his or her position, and accountability, 
or how representatives can be disciplined for acting contrary to the will of their 
constituencies. The second is symbolic representation, which refers to the figurat ive 
actions that representatives take—particularly in view of the public eye—that are 
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intended to increase levels of support for them and for their policies among their 
constituents. Third is descriptive representation, the extent to which a representative 
“looks like” his or her constituency. This is generally discussed in terms of race, religion, 
or gender, but can be extended to include things like background and experience. Last, 
substantive representation is how the representative represents the interests, or will, of his 
or her constituency. 
  In the research on representation, descriptive and substantive representation are 
often used together, though they are distinct concepts. In her 1995 book, The Politics of 
Presence, Anne Phillips presents a theory as to why we should expect a link between 
descriptive and substantive representation. Focusing on the representation of women, she 
argues that there are differences in the lives and experiences of women and men and that, 
to some extent, women share these experiences with one another. She thus expected a 
logical link between descriptive and substantive representation—female lawmakers will 
naturally represent the interests of women. This theory can be extended to other groups 
who share experiences as well: racial minorities, and, perhaps, people of similar 
education levels. 
Heinz Eulau and Paul Karps (1977) expanded on Pitkin’s conception of 
representation by focusing specifically on responsiveness. They disaggregated this 
concept into four areas: policy responsiveness, service responsiveness, allocative 
responsiveness, and symbolic responsiveness. Policy responsiveness is related to Pitkin’s 
concept of substantive representation, and deals with the relationship between the 
representative and the constituent on matters of public policy. Service responsiveness 
refers to how representatives provide particular services to individuals or groups. 
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Allocational responsiveness is related to the actual provision of benefits to the 
representative’s district or to individual constituents or groups. Finally, symbolic 
responsiveness, similar to Pitkin’s model, refers to the actions that a representative takes 
to build trust and capital with the people that they represent.   
 In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I use experimental manipulations involving 
communications via email with state legislative offices to examine representation. 
Responding to email communication falls into a category of the kind of quotidian 
casework that makes up the bulk of the daily work of a state legislative office (Jewell 
1982; Keefe and Ogul 1985). In fact, the frequency with which this occurs led Malcom 
Jewell to suggest adding a fifth category of responsiveness—communication 
responsiveness—to Eulau and Karps’ model (Jewell 1982).  
Casework refers generally to the actions taken by legislative offices to provide a 
specific benefit for one constituent or a group of constituents. This can take the form of 
answering questions, assisting with regulation navigation, helping with benefit eligibility, 
or even job assistance. Though congressional scholars have studied casework at the 
federal level (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1980; Serra and Moon 1994; Fenno, 1978; 
Fiorina 1974, 1977; Mann and Wolfinger 1980; Yiannakis 1981; Wagner 2007; Frantzich 
1986; Johannes 1983; Parker 1986), few have examined casework at the state legislative 
level.  
Casework can be viewed as representation or responsiveness as these concepts are 
described by Pitkin, and Eulau and Karps. Specifically, casework embodies Pitkin’s 
concept of substantive representation and with Eulau and Karps’ service responsiveness 
model. Casework can also be seen as foundational to symbolic representation or 
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responsiveness. It is important to note that existing research has found significant 
variation in the amount of casework that state legislative offices perform. This suggests 
meaningful variation in this particular form of representation or responsiveness. There 
have been various attempts to explain this variation, including individual factors such as 
personal enjoyment (Rosenthal 1981), developing relationships with constituents 
(Diamond 1977), electoral advantage (Patterson 1990; Rosenthal 1993) and political 
ideology (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Johannes 1984). State and district factors, 
such as urbanization (Johannes 1984), institutional culture (Jewell 1982), and legislative 
professionalism (Jewell 1982; Patterson 1990; Rosenthal 1993) have also been shown to 
have an effect. There has been little research, however, using the individual 
characteristics of constituents to explain differences in casework-based responsiveness or 
representation. 
While casework is clearly related to service, “democratic theory suggests that 
representation should be associated with both service and policy responsiveness” (Serra 
and Moon 1994, 200). Addressing multiple types of responsiveness, as I do here in this 
manuscript is a key contribution. As Eulau and Karps (1978) note, “If responsiveness is 
limited to one component, it cannot capture the complexities of the real world of politics” 
(61). Indeed, “what makes it representation is not any single action by any one 
participant, but the overall structure and functioning of the system” (Pitkin 1967, 221-
222). The degree of lawmaker responsiveness to the literal questions and problems of 
constituents is one, individual- level element of representation. Representation, however, 
also has a more macro-level component—the reflection of constituent interests in public 
policy.  
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Collective, or policy, representation theory (Weissberg 1978), is related to 
Pitkin’s substantive representation and Eulau and Karp’s policy responsiveness. It is most 
often studied through policy outcomes rather than through the behavior of individual 
representatives, and asks whether or not the will of the people is reflected in the policies 
that are implemented by the representatives. The answer, at least in a general public 
opinion sense, seems to be yes (Erickson 1976; Erickson et al. 1993; Wetstein 1996; 
Fording 1997; Mooney and Lee 2000; Burstein 2003; Bartels 1991; Hill and Hurley 
1999; Miller and Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson 
1995).  
Weissberg’s conception of collective representation theory is limited, however, to 
mass public opinion, and while the interests of groups such as women (Dovi 2002; 
Phillips 1995; Childs and Krook 2006; Chaney 2006; Swers 1998; 2005), racial 
minorities (Owens 2005; Guinier 1994; Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996) and 
homosexuals (Haider-Markel 2007) have been addressed, the extent to which policy may 
or may not reflect the interests of the less educated is virtually unstudied. Thus whether 
government responds to these interests is unknown, a gap this dissertation seeks to fill. 
 
1.4 Legislative Motivation and Statistical Discrimination 
 The study of legislative behavior has been influenced by the work in rational 
choice theory in the 1950s by Anthony Downs. His assertion that legislators are 
motivated purely by the desire to win elections, causing a convergence in the ideological 
middle, was followed in 1974 in a seminal work by David Mayhew. Mayhew delved 
deeper into the idea that these individuals act in accordance with their desire to win 
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reelection, developing the practical and theoretical argument that legislators are “single-
minded seekers of reelection” (5).  
 Five years later, Richard Fenno offered a more complex version of this idea. He 
had previously argued that in addition to desiring reelection legislators were also 
motivated by the desire to obtain power in their chamber and to create good public 
policy. Later, in his 1978 book, he posited legislators do not merely seek the approval of 
the median voter, as Downs had argued, but had a more nuanced view of the 
constituency. The way he saw it, legislators divide their geographic and reelection 
constituencies up further into personal and primary constituencies. Their personal 
constituency is made of those constituents who are personally close to the legislator. 
Their primary constituency is comprised of their strongest supporters—ones who donate 
money or are willing to campaign on his or her behalf. These four constituencies, which 
he organized into concentric circles, would receive different amounts and kinds of 
attention and responsiveness. After all, “Public officials don’t stand naked before an 
undifferentiated mass public. Nor do they jump through ideological hoops. They are 
pushed—by their partisans, party activists, and fellow officeholders” (Uslaner 1999, p. 
8). 
 Legislators (like most working adults) are busy people with many different 
responsibilities. They are constantly faced with decisions over how to prioritize the many 
things that are fighting for their attention. These decisions do not happen in a vacuum. 
Statistical decision theory is the idea that decision making generally occurs in the 
presence of statistical knowledge, which provides information where there is uncertainty. 
This is a specification of the more general rational choice models where “individuals 
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strive to satisfy their preferences for the consequences of their actions given their beliefs 
about events, which are represented by utility functions and probability distributions” 
(Nau 2002). This idea can certainly be applied to legislative behavior. As Fenno wrote, 
“Every member has some idea of the people most likely to join his reelection 
constituency” (1978, 9). Bartels agreed, writing, “Rational candidates are impelled by the 
goal of vote maximization to discriminate among prospective voters” (1998, 68). 
 These motivations, plus the statistical knowledge, can thus be taken a step further 
into the area of statistical discrimination. Born from social economics, and largely 
applied to wage discrimination studies, statistical discrimination refers to discrimination 
“based on rational expectations given overall statistical trends” (Butler and Broockman 
2011, 465; see also Altonji and Blank 1999). For example, if an employer is aware that, 
in general, historically women have not been as productive as employees as men in terms 
of their labor force attachment they will prefer to hire a male (Hunt and Rubin 1980). 
Likewise, if a legislator (who is motivated by reelection) is aware that a certain type of 
person doesn’t tend to vote, or doesn’t tend to vote for their party, they will instead 
devote their time and attention to someone who will. 
 
1.5 Studying Representation Using the States 
 Using the American states to study representation allows us to explore variation in 
policy, institutions, and populations (Jewell 1982). Indeed, “the ideal place to investigate 
the relationship between public opinion and public policy would seem to be the American 
states. With fifty separate state publics and fifty sets of state policies, the states provide 
an ideal laboratory for comparative research” (Erickson et al. 1993, 2). The variation that 
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this “laboratory” affords us provides useful insight as to why some states are more 
responsive to their uneducated citizens than others. 
 Additionally, state governments generally have a more direct relationship with 
their constituents than the federal government does. From education to electricity to 
roads, many of the services that Americans use on a daily basis are provided or regulated 
by the state government. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the closer 
relationship between people and state governments leads to increased trust in state 
governments relative to trust in the federal government. A recent Gallup poll reports that 
65% of people express some or a great deal of trust in their state government, compared 
to 34% expressing a similar amount of trust in Congress (Jones 2012). 
State governments are also extremely powerful. The United States has a long 
history of valuing state autonomy from the federal government—the Tenth Amendment 
of the Constitution clearly states that “the powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states, respectively, 
or to the people.” The ensuing years saw a considerable expansion of the size and scope 
of the central government, however there is evidence that since the 1990s the balance of 
intergovernmental relations has shifted toward the states (Cho and Wright 2004).  
Though some may counter that the Obama administration is wresting some of this 
power back toward the federal government, it is still the case that the “devolution 
revolution” did expand the policymaking authority of the states, providing ample 
variation for study. For example, when the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 was passed, delegating significant regulatory 
authority to the states, the states came up with many different ways to enact the policy. 
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States like Michigan and Kansas focus on work engagement, while Wisconsin chooses to 
emphasize caseload reduction (Nathan and Gais 2001). The policies that stem from these 
states are thus quite different from each other. By taking advantage of this variation I will 
be able to better evaluate how political representation may differ across the states and by 
certain conditions.  
 
1.6 Dissertation Overview and Contribution 
The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand how the interests of 
Americans with low education are represented by the American political system.  The 
dissertation will examine education, participation and representation quantitatively 
through field experiments designed to measure variation in legislator response to 
constituent inquiry, and by employing Census data to look at the relationship between 
education levels and state-level policy outcomes. Qualitatively, the dissertation will also 
employ case studies of state legislative offices to explore the government side of the 
representative-constituent relationship more fully. This mixed-methods strategy is chosen 
to promote a more comprehensive approach to addressing the key research question at the 
heart of the dissertation--how are individuals with low education levels represented in the 
American political system?  
This study is an important move forward in our understanding of representation in 
the United States. The uneducated have typically been overlooked in terms of their 
participation and representation in favor of a focus on how and why participation 
generally correlates positively with education. Additionally, I use the variation that is 
provided by the states to identify possible mechanisms that explain why some states are 
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more responsive to the less educated than others. This, to my knowledge, is the first 
systematic examination of the variation in the representation of people with little 
education. 
In order to study the unequal representation of the less educated, I must first 
demonstrate that they are, in fact, treated differently than those with more education. I do 
this by employing field experiments on a sample of state legislators. The results of these 
experiments demonstrate that legislators are, in fact, less responsive to communications 
from constituents who are either perceived as or explicitly stated as having less 
education. These results are telling in themselves as to the way that people with different 
levels of education are treated by their representatives, and set the stage for the analysis 
of policy representation that will take place later in the dissertation. 
In Chapter 3, I systematically assess how unequal political responsiveness to the 
uneducated in the American states translates into unequal policy representation. Using 
policy outcome variables related to the amount of spending each state devotes to policies 
that disproportionately affect people with lower education levels, welfare and 
unemployment, I examine the relationship between these and the education levels of the 
citizens in that state.  
Chapter 4, the qualitative contribution to this dissertation, allows us a more in-
depth understanding of the way in which legislative offices communicate with citizens. 
State legislators in Nebraska, Massachusetts, Delaware, Wisconsin, Kansas, and 
Oklahoma agreed to participate in the present research through interviews and surveys. 
Additionally, the legislators have agreed to provide me samples of real constituent 
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communication. This is key, in that it validates the manipulations that I used in the 
experiments in Chapter 2, as well as grounding this study in reality. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I review my main empirical findings in the context of the 
existing state politics, representation, and political inequality literature. I argue that the 
extant literature is largely disjointed, and attempt to reconcile my own results with similar 
studies of class and racial biases in representation. I continue by discussing how my 
dissertation contributes to our growing understanding about the causes of political 
inequality in the American states, and close with an argument as to why even though the 
uneducated among us may not see themselves as a cohesive, ignored group they should 
be treated as such. This discussion may be of utility to those hoping to promote a more 
equal consideration of citizens’ interests in the policymaking process. 
In a representative democracy, it is necessary for the political system to be 
perceived as legitimately contributing to most of the people’s well-being in order to  be 
sustained over an extended period of time. State legislators are in a position, due to their 
“closeness” to the constituents, to encourage the perception of legitimacy, which can, in 
turn, create increased trust in government. “There must be support of legislators before 
there is support for legislatures. Eventually, support for legislators will lead to support for 
legislatures” (Meezy 1976, 124-125). Support for the legislature leads the way to broader 
support for the entire political system, and thus may lead to increased participation 
(Almond and Verba 1963).  
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Chapter 2: State Legislator Communication Responsiveness 
and Education Levels 
 
2.1 Introduction 
  
Equality of political access and political influence are two of the cornerstones of 
what makes a democratic system representative (Butler and Broockman 2011; Dahl 1956; 
Verba 2003).  It is thus unsurprising that variation in access and influence among 
different constituent groups has been a particular research focus of political scientists, 
though the bulk of such research—at least in the United States—is centered on exploring 
racial disparities (e.g. Butler and Broockman 2011; Chavez 1992; Fraga 1992; Hajnal 
2009; Thernstrom 1987).  As far as I am aware, there are no extant empirical studies of 
variation in access to and influence on representatives (legislators) across levels of 
education. 
 Contacting government representatives is an important form of political 
participation (Dalton 2007; Putnam 2000). Historically postal mail was the most common 
way that citizens contacted their representatives, but with the advent of new 
communications technology actual pen and paper letters have fallen into disuse. 
Currently email is, by far, the most common method constituents use to communicate 
with legislators (Pindus et al. 2010). One Senator from Wisconsin reports that while at 
the beginning of his political career he received communication from his constituents 
exclusively via “snail mail”, these days he is surprised if he receives more than two 
letters a month—the rest of the contacts are by email. Further, the explosion of outlets 
like Facebook and Twitter has inspired an effort by many lawmakers to use these forums 
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to “talk” to their constituents (Anderson et al. 2011; Golbeck et al. 2010; NCSL 2011), 
and online discussions, surveys, and town hall meetings are becoming increasingly 
popular (Congressional Management Foundation 2009). 
 Regardless if it comes in the form of a letter, an e-mail or a tweet, in order to be 
truly representative, lawmakers should be responsive to constituent input and inquiry 
(Burke 1774; King and Stivers 1998; Nalbandian 1991; Stivers 1994). Empirical research 
clearly suggests that such responsiveness varies with constituent characteristics, most 
notably race (e.g. Butler and Broockman 2011). This chapter explores state legislator 
communication responsiveness to constituents of varying education levels—both 
perceived and explicit—using a series of three field experiments. These studies seek to 
answer the question, “Are state legislators more responsive to communication from more 
educated constituents?” 
 
2.2 Background and Hypotheses 
  
As discussed in Chapter 1, lawmakers are motivated by their goal of reelection. 
To achieve this goal public officials undertake certain actions, including being responsive 
to constituent casework in order to claim credit for helping their people (Mayhew 
1974)—in other words they engage in substantive, or service responsiveness. Essentially, 
if constituents know that the lawmaker was the one that helped them with their problem 
or inquiry, they are more likely to see that lawmaker as a helpful and effective public 
official. Further, this kind of helpfulness elicits trust from the constituency, enabling the 
lawmaker a certain amount of leverage when it comes to his or her in the capitol (Fenno 
1978).   
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 Lawmakers, however, cannot give everyone all of their attention all of the time. 
The idea that legislators have a pretty good idea of who will and who will not be a 
supporter come election time has been a popular theme in the research on legislative 
behavior since the 1970s. For example wealthier Americans tend to vote at higher rates 
than poorer ones, and Larry Bartels (2002) found that U.S. Senators are “vastly more 
responsive to the views of affluent constituents than to constituents of modest means” 
(21). In 2005, Martin Gilens found similar, possibly even more disheartening, results—
policy outcomes vary with the preferences of the richest Americans, but do not reflect at 
all the preferences of poor or middle- income ones (Gilens 2005). 
 This sort of statistical discrimination can be broken down even further. Butler and 
Broockman (2011) noted that black voters tend to cast their votes for the Democratic 
candidate nearly all of the time, and thus hypothesized that a rational Republican 
legislator would be more responsive to a white constituent than a black one. The results 
of their study did, in fact, indicate that this was the case. Further, they found that when 
the black “constituent” specified that he was a Republican, this effect disappeared. These 
results show that legislators may be relying on racial cues when deciding where to 
allocate their attention and resources. 
 Research on descriptive and substantive representation often, but not always, 
posits that the way to ensure the representation of minority groups is to make sure that 
individuals of similar backgrounds are being elected. Jane Mansbridge’s 1999 article title 
is quite descriptive of this line of thinking: “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women 
Represent Women? A Contingent ‘Yes’”. There is a substantial amount of research to 
back this up. For example, along with Mansbridge, many researchers have found that 
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female representatives, sharing gendered experiences, are more likely to introduce and 
vote for legislation that is in the interest of women (e.g. Dovi 2002; Phillips 1995; Childs 
and Krook 2006; Chaney 2006; Swers 1998). There have been similar findings for blacks 
(Owens 2005; Guinier 1994; Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996) and Latinos 
(Minta 2011; Wilson 2010). Other studies disagree, finding that this sort of direct 
substantive representation does not occur for all groups all of the time (Hero and Tolbert 
1995; Kerr and Miller 2007; Knoll 2009). 
 The vast majority of research in the areas of descriptive and substantive 
representation looks at policy outcomes and roll-call voting. In this chapter, I focus on a 
more literal use of the idea of responsiveness—email responses to a constituent inquiry. It 
has been argued that researchers are missing critical information about processes when 
they merely look at the end results (Young 1990). Further, responsiveness in this sense 
has real-world implications that have been documented in the literature—there is 
evidence that when historically underserved groups, such as women and racial minorities, 
perceive their representatives as being responsive they vote at higher rates 
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Griffin and Keane 2006). 
 Representation of individuals with relatively low levels of education has received 
virtually no attention in the academic literature, in spite of education’s preeminence in the 
voter participation literature (and thus its clear importance to representation). The studies 
in race and gender do, however, give us insight as to what results we might expect in 
terms of the present study. The data consistently show that there is a significant positive 
correlation between education and voting. It has also been demonstrated that legislators 
use statistical discrimination—whether it is conscious or not—when it comes to 
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allocating their time and resources. Consequently, I hypothesize that legislators will be 
more responsive to constituents who are perceived to have more education (Hypothesis 
1). 
 Statistical discrimination can also provide us with a more specific hypothesis for 
the studies in this chapter. Voters with relatively low education levels tend to vote for 
Democratic candidates—Obama, for instance, garnered a majority of the vote from those 
voters with no high school and no college degrees in the most recent presidential election 
(New York Times 2012). Accordingly, I expect Democratic representatives to be more 
responsive to communication from uneducated constituents than their Republican 
counterparts (Hypothesis 2).  
Phillips (1995) argued that the mere presence of women in governing bodies 
should increase their substantive representation. Shared experiences and a naturally-
occurring empathy will necessarily benefit the female members of the constituency. She 
argues that this principle is transferrable to other historically disadvantaged, or 
underrepresented, groups. I propose that those members of American society who have 
relatively lower levels of education may fit this model. Education certainly endows 
certain types of shared experiences—graduation, classes, coursework, and for many, 
particular social experiences. Not going to college also bestows shared experiences. 
Those who drop out of high school largely miss out on the specific experiences unique to 
those who obtain further education. They are often limited in the types of jobs available 
to them, and tend to be overrepresented amongst those who do not have health insurance 
and who collect government benefits. They also make up a majority of those Americans 
who became parents as teenagers.  
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If the relatively uneducated are, in fact, a cohesive group (even if they don’t 
necessarily see themselves as such) in terms of shared experiences and specific interests, 
it follows that they may be most appropriately represented by legislators who also lack 
extended education. Perhaps individual legislators who did not attend college (there are 
very few, if any, who did not complete high school in the entire country and none in my 
sample) would be more sympathetic to, or unfazed by, communication from constituents 
who clearly lack education as well. Hypothesis 3 is, then, legislators with less education 
themselves will be more responsive to the uneducated constituents than their better-
educated counterparts. 
 Research has indicated that districts with lower socioeconomic statuses tend to 
field more demands for constituent services, thus tending to be more highly responsive in 
general. Furthermore, low SES districts are more likely to contain racial and ethnic 
minorities, and those who have lower relative levels of education (Jewell 1982; Thomas 
1992). Studies two and three in this chapter examine this area, expecting to find that 
districts with higher percentages of minority residents and individuals who did not 
complete high school will have legislative offices that are relatively more responsive to 
the uneducated constituent (Hypothesis 4). 
Per the relevant literature, I am also including several control variables in my 
models. Female legislators tend to spend more time on constituency service than males 
do (Richardson and Freeman 1995; Thomas 1992), so gender is included. Staff size has 
been found to have an effect on the time that an office is able to allocate to casework 
(Patterson 1990; Jewell 1982; Rosenthal 1993; Freeman and Richardson 1994), so 
legislative professionalism/capacity is included. Senate offices, generally having larger 
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staffs and budgets, tend to devote more time to constituent services than House offices 
(Rosenthal 1993). Finally, individual legislator’s views on government spending have 
been found to influence casework in that those who favor limited government spend less 
time on it (Cain et al. 1987; Johannes 1984). These variables may impact overall 
responsiveness, however there is no specific reason to believe that they would affect the 
responsiveness to a well-educated constituent over one who is not so well-educated. 
 
2.4 Study 1 Design and Results 
 
The three studies in this chapter employ field experiments on samples of state 
legislative offices from around the United States. The sample is specifically of legislative 
offices rather than of legislators themselves because it is logical to expect that many 
legislators do not answer their own correspondence. The methods used for this 
experiment are adapted from Butler and Broockman (2011). Their study focused on 
racially-based differences in legislative responses to inquiries; this project employs a 
similar research design and employs similar methods to look at differences in legislative 
responses to constituent contacts based on perceived or declared education levels. 
For the first study, a sample of 500 state legislator names1 was randomly selected 
from the National Conference of State Legislatures database (www.ncsl.org) during the 
spring of 2011. The email addresses for each of the legislators in the sample was then 
obtained from individual state legislative web pages. This sample consisted of five 
                                                                 
1 Due to the deception involved in this study, as well as the sensitive nature of the legislators’ positions, 
privacy was a concern for the Institutional Review Board. Thus, all data was anonymized, and no names 
will be used in this study. 
26 
 
 
 
Representatives and five Senators2 from each state. Though the goal initially was to 
include all fifty states, there were practical roadblocks preventing full coverage.3 First, 
several states do not provide email addresses for their legislators, preferring to use 
electronic submission forms instead. As this was unduly burdensome considering the 
time and personnel restraints for this project, those states were omitted. Due to email 
delivery issues and job turnover due to resignations and retirements, several legislators 
were dropped from the sample. After this cleaning and attrition, the data set contained 
332 legislative offices (51 percent House and 49 percent Senate). The data set is 52 
percent Republican, which is not statistically different from the percentage Republican 
(54 percent) of all state legislators after the 2010 elections (t=-.798, p=.425). Thirty-three 
percent of the sample is female, which is slightly higher than the whole population of 
state legislators nationwide (23.7 percent, t=3.754, p<.001). While not a truly random 
sample of all state legislative offices, the sample is broadly representative of that 
population. 
Each of the offices in the sample was sent two emails two weeks apart. The 
emails were randomly alternated in terms of which was sent first and which was sent 
second, and both came from generic, name-based Gmail accounts. The emails were sent 
individually rather than in a large batch to prevent bounce-back from spam filters. One 
email was high quality, with no spelling or grammatical errors (Email A). 
  
                                                                 
2 The names by which these legislators are called in each state vary, but I will use these designations to 
denote membership in the House of Representatives/Assembly/Lower House and Senate/Upper House.  
3 The states not included in this study are Alaska, California, Idaho, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas and Washington. 
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Email A 
Dear Senator XXXXX, 
My name is Brian Johnson, and I am trying to figure out how to register to vote for the 
upcoming election. I am new to the area and unfamiliar with the institutions and 
procedures here. Due to the current antagonistic political climate, and the historic nature 
of the next round of elections, I want to make sure that I have plenty of time to register.  
If you could please let me know who I should call, or where I should go to register, I 
would really appreciate it. Thank you for your time.  
Best, 
Brian Johnson 
 
The other, while substantively similar in content was poorly written and contains serious 
grammatical and spelling errors (Email B).  
 
Email B 
Dear mr XXXXX 
I am jakemarshall. I would  like to lern to registor to vote for the next electshun. I jus 
moved here and dont know how to do stuff here. I know that importat stuff is happen in 
the world and I want to make my voice herd. Where can I go or call for signing up? 
Thanks for youre time 
Jake marshall 
 
 
Writing skill is intrinsically linked with education levels in two different ways. 
First, the ability to write well has consistently been found to predict future academic 
attainment and success (Graham and Perin 2007; Mattern 2010; Raiscot 2012). 
Essentially, having developed skills at written communication, either directly or through 
another related trait, makes individuals more likely to obtain more years of education and 
to do well at it. Second, in the vein of “practice makes perfect”, having more years of 
education generally makes people better writers (Dowhower 1989; Ericsson 2006; 
Newell and Rosenbloom 1980). Given this, the emails can be assumed to be sending 
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different signals about the likely education levels of the senders and thus serve as the 
experimental manipulation. 
In order to test my hypotheses, I examine three different dependent variables: 
response/no response, time (in days) to respond, and extent of engagement (measured in 
number of words in the response email).  Analysis of these three different aspects of 
responsiveness will allow for a particularly nuanced look at how responsiveness works—
is it simply that the poorly-written emails will not receive as many reply emails as the 
well-written ones? Or within the replies, will there be differences as to how and when the 
legislative offices interact with these “constituents”?  
Each legislator/office was coded for several different attributes based on the 
relevant literature regarding variation in casework effort expenditures, and include 
legislator gender (Richardson and Freeman 1995; Thomas 1992), legislative 
professionalism4 (Jewell 1982; Freeman and Richardson 1994; Patterson 1990; Rosenthal 
1993), chamber (Rosenthal 1993) and legislator party (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; 
Johannes 1984; Rosenthal 1993). Further, in order to test hypothesis 3, each legislator 
was coded for their highest level of educational attainment5 (Table 2.1). 
 
 
  
                                                                 
4 This measure is taken from the National Conference of State Legislatures. They split the states up into 5 
groups based on what percent of a full-time job the legislatures require of their legislators. The staff 
capacity, which is highly correlated with full-timeness, of each legislature is also taken into account. 
 
5 1=High School, 2=Some College, 3=Associates or equivalent degree, 4=Bachelor’s Degree, 5=Graduate 
Degree 
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Table 2.1: Univariate Statistics for Independent Variables 
 
     
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Dev 
Gender 0 (male) 1 (female) .330 .472 
Party 0 
(Democrat) 
1 
(Republican) 
.520 .500 
Chamber 0 (senate) 1 (house) .490 .501 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
1 5 2.621 .987 
Education level 1 (high 
school 
diploma) 
5 (graduate 
degree) 
3.961 1.258 
 
    
     
The first area of interest for this study is a comparison of the rates of response to 
each of the emails—a simple “did they respond” measure. Responses to both emails 
began appearing almost immediately, with the first one arriving a mere 6 minutes later. 
Response rates were analyzed in two different ways.  First, Repeated Measures Analysis 
of Variance (RM-ANOVA) was used to examine the difference in means in the rates of 
response to the two experimental conditions, allowing a test for the first hypothesis. A 
significant result stemming from this test will indicate that there is indeed a 
responsiveness difference between Email A and Email B. Next, Chi-Square analysis and 
multinomial logistic regression (multinomial logit) models were used to test Hypotheses 
2 and 3, analyzing potential effects of legislator party and education level. Significant 
results for variables in these models would indicate that legislator party or gender (or one 
of the control variables in the logit model) is influencing the responsiveness of the 
legislative office.  
The initial analysis shows a significant difference between the mean response rate 
to the well-written email (M=.62, SD=.486) and the poorly-written email (M=.45, 
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SD=.498), F(1, 331)=30.526, p<.001 (Figure 2.1). This result supports Hypothesis 1: the 
skilled emailer was more responded to, or represented, than his less-skilled counterpart. 
 
Figure 2.1: Mean Differences in Response Rate to the Experimental Conditions 
 
 
 
 I did not, however, find similar support for Hypothesis 2 in these data. In order to 
test whether Democratic legislators were more responsive to the poorly-written email, I 
performed a chi-square test of independence (Table 2.2). The relationship between these 
variables was not significant, X2 (3, N = 332) =.563, p=.905. Democratic lawmakers in 
this sample did not respond more often to the poorly-written email than Republican 
lawmakers. 
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Table 2.2 Crosstabluation of Political Party and Response to Emails 
 No 
Response 
Responded to 
Well-Written 
Only 
Responded to 
Poorly-Written 
Only 
Responded 
to Both 
Emails 
Total 
Democrat 49 45 14 52 160 
Republican 52 43 17 60 172 
Total 101 88 31 112 332 
 
 There is also no support for Hypothesis 3. A chi-square test was performed to 
determine whether there is a relationship between response to the emails and the 
legislators’ educational attainment (Table 2.3). The relationship between these variables 
was also not significant, X2 (12, 332) = 17.517, p=.131. Having lower personal levels of 
education was not associated with higher response rates to the poorly-written email.  
 
Table 2.3 Crosstabluation of Legislator Education Level and Response to Emails 
 
 No 
Response 
Responded to 
Well-Written 
Only 
Responded to 
Poorly-Written 
Only 
Responded 
to Both 
Emails 
Total 
High 
School 
8 6 1 11 26 
Some 
College 
13 8 4 8 33 
Associate’s 
Degree 
8 0 1 4 13 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
33 28 16 38 115 
Graduate 
Degree 
39 45 9 51 144 
Total 101 87 31 112 332 
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 To more fully test the relationship between the variables, paying particular 
attention to the expected role of the control variables, I ran a multinomial logistic 
regression (multinomial logit) model. For this model, the dependent variable is a 
categorical construction of the response variable (no response, responded to the well-
written email only, responded to the poorly-written email only, responded to both 
emails). There is a relationship present between the response variable and the 
independent variables (legislator education level, chamber, party, and gender) in the 
model. In this analysis, the probability of the model chi-square of 59.456 was .003. The 
null hypothesis that there was no difference between the model without independent 
variables and the model with independent variables was rejected; the existence of a 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable was 
supported.  The relationship, however, appears to be largely driven by legislative 
capacity, and this is the only statistically significant independent variable in the full 
model (X2=31.622, p=.002).  
Coefficient estimates for the full multinomial logit model are displayed in Table 
2.4. The first column contrasts legislators who responded to the well-written email only 
to those who did not respond to either email. The second column compares those who 
responded to the poorly-written email only to legislators who did not respond at all. The 
third column contrasts those who responded to both to the no-response legislators. 
Contrasting the “no response” condition with the three other possible conditions allows 
us to examine whether any of the independent variables accounts for a particular kind of 
response. Specifically, if a variable explains a move from not responding to responding to 
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the well-written email only, we might start to understand what type of legislators are 
likely to be less representative of the poorly educated constituent. 
In all three, we see that the variables that are significant are the legislative 
capacity variables. Legislators who work for legislatures with higher levels of legislative 
capacity, or professionalism, are, as expected, simply more likely to respond. Only one 
other variable appears to be significant—the gender variable in the last column has a 
probability value of .05. While the result is in the expected direction (female legislators 
are more likely to have responded to both emails), it is possible that this is a statistical 
artifact—the fallout of running a large model.  
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Table 2.4 Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Response to Emails6 
Variable       Responded to  Responded to  Responded to 
                                      Well-Written Only           Poorly-Written Only             Both 
       Coefficient (SE)             Coefficient (SE)           Coefficient 
(SE) 
________________________________________________________________________
______ 
High School   -.162 (.607)  -.366 (1.146)     .141 (.544) 
Some College   -.530 (.520)   .380 (.704)    -.715 (.523) 
Associate’s Degree  -19.183 (52.51) -.416 (1.149)    -.980 (.694) 
Bachelor’s Degree  -.157 (.358)  .883 (.503)    -.067 (.343) 
Graduate Degree  ---   ---     --- 
Senate    -.002 (.309)  .440 (.432)    -.296 (.292) 
House    ---   ---     --- 
Democrat   .146 (.320)  -.001 (.440)    .013 (.302) 
Republican   ---   ---     --- 
Very Low Leg Capacity -18.937 (.894)** -19.469 (1.076)** -18.956 
(.680)** 
Low Leg Capacity  -18.945 (.844)** -19.589 (1.004)** -19.274 
(.637)** 
Medium Leg Capacity  -18.342 (.834)** -18.696 (.966)** -18.013 
(.609)** 
High Leg Capacity  -17.638 (.719)** -19.445 (1.279) ** -17.959 
(.001)** 
Very High Leg Capacity ---   ---   --- 
Male    .553 (.327)  .233 (.446)  .608 (.311)* 
Female    ---    ---  --- 
Intercept   18.139 (.867)** 17.087 (1.058)** 18.431 
(.657)** 
Model X2   59.456** 
Number of Cases  332 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: The contrast variable for the model is the “did not respond to either email” 
category. 
** p<.01, *p<.05 
                                                                 
6 I tested for interaction effects in each of the models in this chapter, however none were significant and are 
therefore not included in my analysis. 
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Next, I examined how long it took for the responses from the legislative offices to 
arrive. Marginally supporting Hypothesis 1, there was a mean difference (approaching 
significance at the .05 level) in the time in days that it took the legislative offices to 
respond to the well-written (M=1.74, SD=2.857) and the poorly-written emails (M=2.42, 
SD=3.977), f=3.870, p=.052 (Figure 2.2).  
Figure 2.2: Mean Differences in Time to Respond Between Emails 
 
 
 Though there is a difference in the time that it took for the legislators to respond 
to the well-written and poorly written emails, this difference does not appear to be 
explained by legislator party or education level, thus not supporting Hypothesis 2 or 3 
once more. Repeated-measures ANCOVA, with party, education level, gender, legislative 
capacity, and chamber as the covariates revealed that none of these variables accounted 
for the differences between the times it took for legislators to respond to the emails, 
though the model does approach significance (F=3.870, p=.052, see Table 2.5).  
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Table 2.5: ANCOVA Tests of Within and Between Subjects Contrasts for Response 
Time 
 Between 
Subjects Mean 
Square 
Between 
Subjects F-Test 
Within Subjects 
Mean Square 
Within Subjects 
F-Test 
Intercept 11.048 .658**   
Education Level .200 .012   
Chamber 1.888 .112   
Party 12.545 .747   
Legislative Capacity 34.434 2.051   
Gender 9.394 .560   
Error 16.788    
     
Time Difference   7.842 .006 
Time Difference*Ed 
Level 
  1.488 .225 
Time 
Difference*Chamber 
  2.870 .406 
Time 
Difference*Party 
  .062 .009 
Time 
Difference*Legislative 
Capacity 
  .188 .027 
Time 
Difference*Gender 
  1.514 .214 
Error   7.067  
*p<.05 **p<.01 
 
The final area of interest for this study concerns the extent to which the response 
emails engage with the constituent, measured in terms of the number of words in the 
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response emails. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, there was no significant mean difference in 
the extent of engagement between the well-written (M=63.39, SD=44.679) and poorly-
written (M=58.18, SD=44.699) emails (t=-.184, p=.854) (Figure 2.3). 
 
Figure 2.3: Mean Differences in Extent of Engagement Between Emails 
 
 
There is no difference in the extent to which the legislators responded to the 
emails, and there is no relationship with party or education level, again failing to provide 
support for Hypothesis 2 or 3. Repeated-measures ANCOVA, with party, education level, 
gender, legislative capacity, and chamber as the covariates revealed that none of these 
variables are related to the number of words in the response emails (F=1.820, p=.180, see 
Table 2.6).  
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Table 2.6: ANCOVA Tests of Within and Between Subjects Contrasts for Engagement 
 Between 
Subjects Mean 
Square 
Between 
Subjects F-Test 
Within Subjects 
Mean Square 
Within Subjects 
F-Test 
Intercept 53795.833 18.129**   
Education Level 6935.647 2.337   
Chamber 1841.032 .620   
Party 14227.165 4.794   
Legislative Capacity 4431.320 1.493   
Gender 1331.711 .449   
Error 2967.446    
     
Engagement   3569.683 4.087* 
Engagement *Ed Level   131.506 .151 
Engagement *Chamber   746.955 .855 
Engagement *Party   422.461 .484 
Engagement 
*Legislative Capacity 
  2932.390 3.357 
Engagement *Gender   1505.885 1.724 
Error   873.520  
*p<.05 **p<.001 
 
In summary, the results from Study One, suggest that compared to well-written 
emails, poorly written emails are less likely to receive a response from a state legislative 
office and, if a response is forthcoming, it is likely to be slower. There appears to be little 
difference in the extent of response (number of words) to poorly and well written emails. 
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2.5 Study 2 Design and Results 
 
The overall finding from Study 1 is that the poorly-written email received far 
fewer responses than the well-written email. It is possible, however, that the extreme 
nature of the emails was enough to unfairly influence the results (perhaps the “good” 
email was too good, and vice-versa). In order to parse this out, I ran a slightly altered 
version of the experiment during the fall of 2012. In this replication, the quality of each 
of the emails was tempered slightly, but with clear quality differences remaining (Emails 
C and D). 
 
Email C 
Dear Senator XXXXX, 
My name is Joseph Anderson. I am moving to your district and I am trying to find out 
how to register to vote. I want to make sure that I can stay involved there, so if you could 
please let me know where to go, I would appreciate it. 
Thank you, 
Joseph Anderson 
 
Email D 
Dear Senator XXXXX, 
My name is Michael Peterson. Im moving to the area and Im trying to register for voting. 
I want to make sure that I be staying involved there, so if you could let me know where to 
go, I would be greatful. 
Thanks, 
Michael Peterson 
 
 Again, a sample of state legislator names was selected from the NCSL database 
and the corresponding email address collected from each state’s legislative website. This 
time, close to two years later, more states had chosen to “tighten up” their email systems 
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leaving 33 states in the sample.7 After attrition, 324 state legislative offices remained (54 
percent House, and 46 percent Senate). The sample is slightly heavy on female legislators 
(33 percent, versus the national percentage of 23.7 percent, t=2.075, p=.039), and is 
representative of the partisan makeup of state legislatures nationally (t=1.362, p=.174). 
Again, though not a random sample, it is relatively representative in terms of the gender, 
partisanship and chamber membership of state legislators. 
Because I am running three separate experiments in this chapter that involve 
emails to legislators and the overuse of deceptive methods is a concern, for Studies 2 and 
3 I opted to split the samples and send half of the legislators the higher quality email and 
half the lower quality email. The legislators were randomly assigned to one of the two 
conditions and sent either the high or low quality email. Both emails came from generic 
name-based Microsoft Outlook email addresses (a different email addresses than those 
used in study 1 in case of sample overlap with Study 1).   
As in Study 1, replies to the “constituents” began arriving very quickly. In fact, 
61% of the replies that came in did so within 24 hours. Again, I examine three simple 
dependent variables: response (yes/no), time to respond (in days), and extent of 
engagement (measured in number of words). For each dependent variable I examine 
mean differences between the well-written email and poorly-written email recipients 
through one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) before accounting for the relevant 
control variables by including a fixed factor (email condition) and covariates to the 
models. For each of the dependent variables in this study, the models first include the 
same control variables that were included in the analyses in Study 1 (Legislator party, 
                                                                 
7 Excluded in this study are AK, CA, ID, FL, IN, KY, ME, MT, NE, NJ, OH, PA, RI, SD, SC, TX and WA. 
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Legislator gender, Legislator education level, chamber, and legislative professional 
capacity, see Table 2.7 for the univariate statistics). In order to test Hypothesis 4, I go one 
step further in this study (and in Study 3, below) and estimate further-specified models to 
include variables to account for the demographic makeup of the constituency (Jewell 
1982; Thomas 1992). By doing this, we are better able to understand whether legislators 
“know their audience” and might be more or less likely to receive communication from 
individuals with lower education levels purely based on the demographics of the 
population in their state (also in Table 2.7). 
 
Table 2.7: Univariate Statistics for Independent Variables 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
     
Gender 0 (Male) 1 (Female) .330 .470 
Party 0 (Democrat) 1 (Republican) .560 .497 
Education Level 1 5 3.96 1.269 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
1 5 2.73 .977 
State Percentage 
with no High 
School 
8.20 19.60 13.051 3.309 
District 
Percentage 
Black 
0 92 12.930 18.644 
District 
Percentage 
Hispanic 
1 75 9.07 11.738 
 
  
As hypothesized, and consistent with the results of Study 1, the well-written email 
received a significantly higher response rate than did the poorly-written email 
(F(1,322)=17.045, p<.001). As Figure 2.4 illustrates, recipients of the well-written email 
responded at a rate of slightly over 70%, while those who received the poorly-written 
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email responded less than 50% of the time. Clearly, tempering the quality of the emails 
from the extremes of Study 1 did not diminish the mean difference; in fact, there is a 
slightly larger mean effect.  
 
Figure 2.4: Mean Differences in Response Rate to the Experimental Conditions 
 
 
 
 
 Next, in order to test Hypotheses 2 and 3, I performed an analysis of variance 
looking at the response rate of the emails using condition (the well-written or poorly-
written email) as a fixed factor and chamber, legislative professionalism, party, gender, 
and education level as covariates. Significant F-tests on the party or education level 
variables would indicate support for the hypotheses, demonstrating that those variables 
affect the response differential found in the means comparison above. As the results, 
presented in Table 2.7, indicate, however, neither legislator party nor legislator 
educational attainment accounts for the difference. Chamber reaches a significance level 
of .10, indicating that there may be an effect present (Representatives were more likely to 
respond to the poorly-written email relative to the well-written one, perhaps due to 
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shorter terms and more frequent campaigning). There is, however, no support for 
Hypotheses 2 or 3 in these data. 
Table 2.7: Test of Between Subject Effects of Response Differential 
 Mean Square F Significance 
Intercept 5.514 23.947 .000 
Condition 3.467 15.056 .000 
Party .188 .819 .366 
Education Level .151 .656 .418 
Chamber .676 2.935 .088 
Legislative 
Capacity 
.002 .008 .927 
Gender .294 1.279 .259 
Error .230   
N=320 
R2=.061 
   
  
 
 An expanded model that tests whether controlling for population demographic 
characteristics alters the story fails to support Hypotheses 2, 3, and now 4 as well. Table 
2.8 presents the results of this model that includes the percentage of the population that is 
black, Hispanic, on welfare, and that did not graduate high school. While the chamber 
variable is significant (House members were more responsive to the poorly-written email 
as compared to how responsive they are to the well-written email), and the welfare 
variable is significant (legislators in districts with more welfare recipients were less likely 
to respond to the well-written email relative to the poorly-written one), neither education 
level nor party gains significance, indicating that neither variable affects the response rate 
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differences. There is no support for Hypotheses 2 and 3, and little support for Hypothesis 
4. 
 
Table 2.8: Tests of Between Subjects Effects of Response Differential (Expanded Model) 
 Mean Square F Significance 
Intercept 7.002 30.968 .000 
Condition 2.543 11.249 .001 
Party .414 1.831 .177 
Education Level .090 .397 .529 
Chamber .975 4.313 .039 
Legislative Capacity .298 1.320 .252 
Gender .551 2.436 .120 
Black Population .001 .003 .956 
Hispanic Population .001 .006 .939 
Population with No 
High School Degree 
.591 2.613 .107 
Population on 
Welfare 
1.398 6.185 .013 
Error .226   
N=320 
R2=.087 
   
  
 
The next variable of interest is the amount of time that it took for legislators to 
respond to the emails. The average amount of time to respond also differs significantly 
between groups (Figure 2.5). The legislators who received the well-written email took 
about half a day to respond (M=.56, SD=1.057), while those who received the poorly-
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written email responded a full day later on average (M=1.53, SD=3.414). This difference 
in means is statistically significant (F(1,192)=8.132, p=.005), again providing support for 
Hypothesis 1.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Mean Differences in Time to Respond to Experimental Conditions 
 
 
 
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3 in terms of response time, I performed an analysis of 
variance looking at the response time to the emails using condition (the well-written or 
poorly-written email) as a fixed factor, and chamber, legislative professionalism, party, 
gender, and education level as covariates. Significant F-tests on the party or education 
level variables would indicate support for Hypotheses 2 and 3, demonstrating that those 
variables affect the response rate differential found above. As the results, presented in 
Table 2.9, indicate, however, neither legislator party nor legislator educational attainment 
accounts for the difference. There is no support for Hypotheses 2 or 3 in these data. 
46 
 
 
 
Table 2.9: Test of Between Subject Effects of Response Time Differential 
 Mean Square F Significance 
Intercept 2.129 .394 .531 
Condition 41.799 7.730 .006 
Party 7.879 1.457 .229 
Education Level .192 .036 .851 
Chamber 8.383 1.550 .215 
Legislative 
Capacity 
8.054 1.489 .224 
Gender 1.681 .311 .578 
Error 5.407   
N=320 
R2=.059 
   
  
The expanded model that examines the potential effects of population 
demographic characteristics also fails to support Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. Table 2.10 
presents the results of this model that includes the same population variables as I included 
in the expanded response model above. Again, significant F-tests on these variables 
would signify that they are systematically associated with the difference found in 
response time to the two email conditions. In this expanded model, neither the 
hypothesized variables nor any of the control variables is significant, indicating that none 
of these variables accounts for the difference in response time to the well-written email 
versus the poorly-written email.  
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Table 2.10: Tests of Between Subjects Effects of Response Differential (Expanded 
Model) 
 Mean Square F Significance 
Intercept 6.940 1.182 .278 
Condition 40.617 6.920 .009 
Party 9.741 1.660 .199 
Education Level .313 .053 .818 
Chamber 9.525 1.623 .204 
Legislative Capacity 1.202 .205 .651 
Gender 2.469 .421 .518 
Black Population 2.836 .483 .488 
Hispanic Population 1.431 .244 .622 
Population with No 
High School Degree 
2.416 .412 .522 
Population on 
Welfare 
2.275 .388 .534 
Error 5.870   
N=320 
R2=.069 
   
  
 
Study 1 and Study 2 suggest that emails from people who do not or cannot write 
well is completely ignored more than 50% of the time by the state legislative offices, and 
when they do reply they are slower to respond to poorly written emails. The extent of 
engagement, however, gives us better news(Figure 2.6). Though the difference in means 
is in the same direction—the well-written email was responded to with more words than 
48 
 
 
 
the poorly-written one—it is not a significant difference (F(1,191)=2.234, p=.137). This 
indicates that while there may be dramatic differences between groups in terms of 
response, those who do respond do so relatively similarly.  
 
Figure 2.6: Mean Differences in Extent of Engagement Between Experimental 
Conditions 
 
 
 
 Analyses of variance using condition as the fixed factor and both the reduced 
(Table 2.11) and expanded (Table 2.12) list of covariates (the same as in the previous 
models in this study) tell the same story and provide no support for Hypotheses 2, 3, and 
4. None of the hypothesized variables show any indication of varying in accordance with 
the extent to which the legislators engaged with the fictional email writers.  
 
 
 
49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.11: Tests of Between Subjects Effects of Communication Engagement  
 Mean Square F Significance 
Intercept 15198.692 6.093 .014 
Condition 5475.648 2.195 .140 
Party 12.209 .005 .944 
Education Level 150.937 .061 .806 
Chamber 593.685 .238 .626 
Legislative Capacity 4978.991 1.996 .159 
Gender 536.253 .215 .643 
Error 2494.505   
N=192 
R2=.028 
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Table 2.12: Tests of Between Subjects Effects of Communication Engagement 
(Expanded Model)  
 Mean Square F Significance 
Intercept 4518.371 1.691 .195 
Condition 7584.373 2.839 .094 
Party 767.838 .289 .593 
Education Level 455.275 .170 .680 
Chamber 450.590 .169 .682 
Legislative Capacity 852.446 .319 .573 
Gender 126.449 .047 .828 
Black Population 3564.175 1.334 .250 
Hispanic Population 1122.669 .420 .518 
Population with No 
High School Degree 
564.730 .211 .646 
Population on 
Welfare 
2580.387 .966 .327 
Error 2671.554   
N=192 
R2=.069 
   
  
 
2.6 Study 3 Design and Results 
 
A potential criticism of the previous two studies is that the critical manipulation—
poorly-written versus well-written emails—only indirectly taps the key concept of 
education levels. Poor writing may be due to other things than education, everything from 
time pressure preventing editing, to learning disabilities, to a simple lack of attention to 
grammar and syntax in email communication. And even if the emails do signal poor 
education, this may be serving as a proxy for constituent cues that legislative offices are 
51 
 
 
 
responding to other than education—race for example8. Accordingly, I conducted a third 
study with the aim of replicating the results of the first two, but with a manipulation that 
more strongly signaled education and not some potential confound. 
In order to test education more directly, the third study in this chapter uses a 
slightly different approach. In this study each email is exactly the same except that one 
specifies that the writer is a high-school dropout (Email E) and the other has a master’s 
degree (Email F).  
 
Email E 
Dear Senator XXXXX, 
I am worried about unemployment in the United States and in our district. I lost my job 
six months ago, and have not been able to find a new one. As someone with a Master’s 
degree, this really worries me. I was wondering what our state is doing to help with 
unemployment. 
Thank you very much, 
Andrew Collins 
 
  
                                                                 
8 It should be noted that the names that were chosen for the email writers were chosen specifically for their 
relative popularity among white Americans compared to black ones (Fryer and Levitt 2004; New York City 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene). 
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Email F 
Dear Senator XXXX 
I am worried about unemployment in the United States and in our district. I lost my job 
six months ago, and have not been able to find a new one. As someone who dropped out 
of high school, this really worries me. I was wondering what our state is doing to help 
with unemployment. 
Thank you very much, 
James Holman 
  
The experiment for Study 3 ran during the spring of 2013 using the other half of 
the sample of state legislators drawn from the NCSL website in Study 2. After accounting 
for attrition, 321 legislators remained in the sample (47 percent House, 53 percent 
Senate). This group is comprised of 67% males, which is below the national rate of 
around 76 percent (t=3.466, p=.001), and 56 percent Republicans, which is descriptive of 
the broader state legislator population (t=.490, p=.624). This study will examine the same 
three dependent variables as the previous two studies: response, time to response, and 
extent of engagement.  
The mean differences in response, as assessed through a one-way ANOVA are 
significant: the well-educated constituent received considerably more responses than the 
less educated one did (F(1,319)=15.486, p<.001). This finding supports the difference of 
means tests from the previous two studies, but rather than relying on writing quality for a 
proxy of education it provides a clear and direct cue of education level (Figure 2.7). 
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Figure 2.7: Mean Differences in Response Rate to the Experimental Conditions 
 
 
 
Next, I tested Hypotheses 2 and 3, by performing an analysis of variance looking 
at the response rate of the emails using condition (Master’s degree versus high school 
dropout) as a fixed factor and chamber, legislative professionalism, party, gender, and 
education level as covariates. Significant F-tests on the party or education level variables 
would indicate support for the Hypotheses 2 and 3, demonstrating that those variables 
affect the response differential found in the one-way ANOVA above. As the results, 
presented in Table 2.13, indicate, however, neither legislator party nor legislator 
educational attainment accounts for the difference. Consistent with the previous studies in 
this chapter, there is no support for Hypotheses 2 or 3 in these data. 
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Table 2.13: Test of Between Subject Effects of Response Differential 
 Mean Square F Significance 
Intercept 5.112 24.496 .000 
Condition 3.423 16.404 .000 
Party .474 2.273 .133 
Education Level .170 .813 .368 
Chamber .091 .435 .510 
Legislative 
Capacity 
.132 .631 .428 
Gender .437 2.095 .149 
Error .209   
N=319 
R2=.066 
   
  
The expanded model testing whether controlling for population demographic 
characteristics alters the story fails to support Hypotheses 2 and 3, and now 4 as well. 
Table 2.14 presents the results of this model that includes the percentage of the 
population that is black, Hispanic, on welfare, and that did not graduate high school. 
Neither the hypothesized variables, nor the control variables contribute significantly to 
the model (though party is significant at the .10 level), providing no support for 
Hypotheses 2 and 3, or 4. 
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Table 2.14: Tests of Between Subjects Effects of Response Differential (Expanded 
Model)  
 Mean Square F Significance 
Intercept 1.625 2.115 .023 
Condition 2.930 14.167 .000 
Party .590 2.852 .092 
Education Level .228 1.102 .295 
Chamber .110 .532 .466 
Legislative Capacity .108 .522 .470 
Gender .255 1.234 .268 
Black Population .003 .013 .998 
Hispanic Population .056 .272 .603 
Population with No 
High School Degree 
.010 .048 .828 
Population on 
Welfare 
.083 .399 .528 
Error .207   
N=290 
R2=.070 
   
  
Response time--the amount of time that it took for the legislators to respond to the 
emails-- is also different (significant at the less-strict .10 level) between the experimental 
conditions (F(1,212)=3.554, p=.061), with the high school dropout’s responses arriving 
later on average than his well-educated counterpart (Figure 2.8). As in studies 1 and 2, 
this provides support for Hypothesis 1. 
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Figure 2.8: Mean Differences Time to Respond by Condition 
 
 
 
 
An analysis of variance test of the effects of education and party using the same 
model as above with condition as the fixed factor and party, education level, chamber, 
legislative professionalism, and gender as covariates indicates that while there is a 
difference in the amount of time that it took for the legislators to respond to the email 
from the writer with the Master’s degree versus the email from the writer who dropped 
out of high school, these differences do not vary systematically by the hypothesized 
variables (or the other control variables). As Table 2.15 demonstrates, the only significant 
variable in the model was condition, or which email the legislator received. As in Studies 
1 and 2, there is no support for Hypotheses 2 or 3. 
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Table 2.15: Test of Between Subject Effects of Response Time Differential 
 Mean Square F Significance 
Intercept 1.104 1.141 .287 
Condition 4.046 4.183 .042 
Party 1.035 1.070 .302 
Education Level 2.057 2.126 .146 
Chamber 1.506 1.557 .214 
Legislative 
Capacity 
1.291 1.335 .249 
Gender .402 .416 .520 
Error .967   
N=212 
R2=.050 
   
  
 The expanded model (Table 2.16) tells a similar story. Significant F-tests on the 
hypothesized variables would have provided evidence in support of the hypotheses. The 
fact that there are no significantly contributing variables other than condition is a clear 
indication that Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 do not hold in these data. Neither the legislator-
level characteristics, party and education level, nor the population demographic variables 
(percent black, percent Hispanic, percent with no high school diploma, and percent on 
welfare) serve to predict the variation in response time to the two emails. 
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Table 2.16: Tests of Between Subjects Effects of Response Time Differential (Expanded 
Model)  
 Mean Square F Significance 
Intercept 3.389 3.670 .057 
Condition 4.002 4.334 .039 
Party 1.843 1.995 .159 
Education Level 1.869 2.024 .157 
Chamber .758 .820 .366 
Legislative Capacity 1.839 1.991 .160 
Gender .093 .101 .751 
Black Population .078 .084 .772 
Hispanic Population .001 .001 .981 
Population with No 
High School Degree 
.607 .657 .419 
Population on 
Welfare 
.356 .386 .535 
Error .923   
N=212 
R2=.075 
   
  
 
As in Studies 1 and 2, there is no difference between conditions in terms of the 
extent to which the legislators engage with the constituent when they do respond (F(1, 
212)=.152, p=.697). The highly educated constituent received, on an average, a response 
of 91 words, while the person who did not complete high school received an average 
response of 88 words (SD=40.34) (Figure 2.9). Though there is a difference in the overall 
response rate to the different emails and the length of time that it took for the legislators 
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to respond, those legislators who did respond to both emails did so similarly in terms of 
email length. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Mean Differences in Extent of Engagement by Condition 
 
 
 
 
Analyses of variance using condition as the fixed factor and both the reduced 
(Table 2.17) and expanded (Table 2.18) list of covariates provide consistent results—no 
support for Hypotheses 2, 3, or 4. None of the hypothesized variables show any 
indication of varying in accordance with the extent to which the legislators engaged with 
the fictional email writers. Chamber does appear to have an effect on engagement such 
that being a member of a state House of Representatives differentiates engagement 
between the two conditions (Representatives wrote more words on average to the less-
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educated constituent relative to the well-educated one compared to their Senate 
counterparts). 
 
Table 2.17: Tests of Between Subjects Effects of Communication Engagement  
 Mean Square F Significance 
Intercept 90601.471 31.413 .000 
Condition 1443.831 .501 .480 
Party 5392.491 1.870 .173 
Education Level 405.845 .141 .708 
Chamber 13341.035 4.626 .033 
Legislative Capacity 1640.447 .569 .452 
Gender 376.028 .130 .718 
Error 2884.216   
N=213 
R2=.031 
   
   
Consistent with the findings in the first two studies in this chapter, the expanded 
model that includes the population demographic variables as additional covariates 
supports the null findings found in the reduced model above. None of the hypotheses are 
supported in this model. Once more, legislators who respond, respond the same to 
different education levels. 
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Table 2.18: Tests of Between Subjects Effects of Communication Engagement 
(Expanded Model)  
 Mean Square F Significance 
Intercept 62199.527 20.460 .000 
Condition 643.726 .212 .646 
Party 2721.333 .895 .345 
Education Level 45.748 .015 .902 
Chamber 10692.685 3.517 .062 
Legislative Capacity 108.311 .036 .850 
Gender 100.442 .033 .856 
Black Population 563.466 .185 .667 
Hispanic Population 211.879 .707 .792 
Population with No 
High School Degree 
6116.966 2.102 .158 
Population on 
Welfare 
1066.908 .351 .554 
Error 3040.063   
N=213 
R2=.052 
   
  
 
2.7 Discussion and Implications 
 
 The three studies presented in this chapter demonstrate a consistent pattern: 
communication from constituents with higher education levels, whether measured by 
proxy through writing level or directly by statement in otherwise identical 
communication, is responded to at higher rates than communication from constituents 
with lower levels. Response to the educated constituents varied from 62% to 80%, while 
response to the less-educated varied from 45% to 60%. Comparing across studies, we see 
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that the higher response rates were seen in Study 3, where the constituents provided the 
most information about themselves and where the less-educated constituent’s email was 
well written, indicating that while education clearly matters, the quality of the 
communication may matter more. 
As Hypothesis 1 was about “responsiveness”, I also looked at how long it took for 
the legislators to reply to the constituents. All three studies found that it took longer, on 
average, for the legislators to respond to the constituent with lower perceived or stated 
education levels, providing further support for Hypothesis 1. It is important to note, 
however, regarding the time to respond DV, that though there are significant differences 
between the experimental conditions, they may not be practically meaningful. In Study 1, 
we are looking at 1.74 days versus 2.42 days, in Study 2 it is .56 days versus 1.53 days, 
and in Study 3 responses to both came in less than 1 day on average. If a real constituent 
was sending these emails, would they notice these differences? Probably not. The 
responses that came generally came relatively quickly, and considering the fact that the 
“constituent” in the experiments was not seeking assistance for any kind of emergency 
situation, the offices that did respond did so in a reasonable timeframe. 
 Hypothesis 1 was not supported in terms of the third test—extent of engagement. 
None of the studies revealed a simple mean difference between conditions in terms of the 
number of words with which the legislative offices replied. Overall, it appears that when 
legislative offices do respond to constituents, they do so in relatively consistent ways 
with regard to people with different education levels.  
 I had also hypothesized that due to voting constituency differences Democrats 
would be more responsive to the less educated constituents. There was, however, 
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absolutely no support for this in these data. In all three studies, legislator party 
identification failed to discriminate the response rate between the emails, signifying that 
even if the theory of statistical discrimination holds true for some demographic 
characteristics, as has been found in the research, education level (perceived or explicit) 
is not one of the ways in which Democratic legislators dole out their time and attention as 
compared to Republican legislators (or vice-versa). Considering the overall low response 
rate to the less-educated constituent, statistical discrimination may still be at work—less 
educated people are simply less likely to turn out on Election Day, so they become a 
lower priority for busy legislators and slip through the cracks. However, even though 
voters with lower education levels tend to vote for Democratic candidates, Democratic 
legislators do not seem to be picking up on this and responding to these people more 
readily. 
 There is also no support for Hypothesis 3 in these data. I had expected that 
perhaps legislators with lower relative levels of educational attainment themselves would 
be sympathetic to, or identify with, constituents with low education levels. This does not 
seem to be the case. In none of the three studies and the three tests therein do legislator 
education levels appear to significantly predict differential responsiveness. This is, 
perhaps, unsurprising. As discussed in Chapter 1, there are individual characteristics that 
incite entitativity (race and religion, for example), but there are other characteristics that 
are simply seen as individual problems. Education may, in fact, be one of the latter. 
Legislators who did not attend college have “risen above” their relative educational 
deficit and seemingly do not see themselves as the same as others with lower educational 
attainment. 
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 Similarly, I did not find in favor of Hypothesis 4. I proposed that legislators who 
work in areas with higher proportions of constituents that did not complete high school, 
are poor, or who are racial minorities would be more responsive to the less-educated 
constituent relative to the better-educated one. This did not prove to be the case. In all 
three studies I tested for the effects of these population demographic characteristics and 
found no support whatsoever for the hypothesis.  
The tests of engagement extent tell a relatively optimistic story (Chapter 4 delves 
more into the content of the response emails), but the larger picture is that not only do 
significant numbers of legislators not respond to emails that they receive at all, their 
response rates differ based on the quality of the initiating email and education level of the 
emailer. While statistical discrimination may make it logical for legislators to allocate 
their time by prioritizing those constituents who are the most likely to vote, and to vote 
for them, there are more serious implications. Individuals with lower levels of education 
are already participating in politics at lower rates than those with more education. 
Furthermore, dissatisfaction with encounters with and service from government officials 
seems to disincline people from participating. Taken together, doing things to discourage 
people with low education levels, such as not responding to their inquiries, only 
continues the cycle in which these individuals do not participate. 
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Chapter 3: State Legislator Policy Responsiveness and 
Educational Attainment 
 
3.1 Introduction 
  This dissertation aims to examine the representation of those Americans 
with low relative education levels by looking at two types of representation. Chapter 2 
examined one type of representation, service (Eulau and Karps 1977) or communication 
responsiveness (Jewell 1982).  This type of representation is centered on the study of 
individual legislator (or legislative office) behavior and provides insight into how 
government representatives interact with their constituents, which is valuable both 
because of the implications for representative democracy and also because of what 
research has told us about how constituent-representative interactions relate to future 
participation. This chapter, however, approaches representation from a different 
perspective: policy responsiveness. In contrast to service or communication 
responsiveness, policy responsiveness examines whether lawmakers create policy that is 
responsive to the interests of his or her constituency. Research suggests that overall, this 
is the case (Erickson 1976; Erickson et al. 1993; Wetstein 1996; Fording 1997; Mooney 
and Lee 2000; Burstein 2003; Bartels 1991; Hill and Hurley 1999; Miller and Stokes 
1963; Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson 1995), but there is some 
indication that this relationship breaks down when examining smaller, discrete groups. 
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3.2 Background  
 A well-established line of research identifies a strong correlation between voters’ 
preferences and the decisions made by their elected representatives (Ansolabehere, 
Snyder and Steward 2001; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Erikson and Wright 
1980, 2005; Erikson, Wright and McIver 1993; Fiorina 1974; Miller and Stokes 1963). 
These efforts, however, tend to treat the public as a single entity, masking potential 
differences in policy responsiveness to different groups of constituents. In fact, when 
researchers pull apart this relationship to test for different levels of responsiveness by 
party (Clinton 2006; Miller 1964; Stone 1982; Wright 1989), gender (Chaney 2006; 
Childs and Krook; Dovi 2002; Phillips 1995; Richardson and Freeman 1995; Thomas 
1992), income (Rigby and Wright 2013) and race (Richardson and Freeman 1995; 
Thomas 1992), they find greater responsiveness to some constituents than to others. Such 
differences in responsiveness are troubling in that they raise questions about the 
legitimacy of representative democracy, which rests on its ability to insulate political 
decision-making from other sources of power and influence in society (Walzer 1983). 
 Research examining differential responsiveness across groups has found that the 
opinions of wealthy, male, white Americans matter much more than the opinions of the 
poor. For example, Bartels (2008) found substantially greater responsiveness to high-
income constituents than those in lower income brackets. Considering the goal of 
equality of political representation, this is a troubling pattern. 
 This sort of responsiveness, such as the response of the political system to the 
policy demands and preferences of citizens, is generically defined as policy 
responsiveness, and it is generally studied by testing the extent to which policy outcomes 
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correlate with public opinion. This can be done en masse, gauging general public opinion 
(Ansolabehere, Snyder and Steward 2001; Canes-Wrone, et al. 2002; Erikson and Wright 
1980, 2005; Erikson, et al. 1993; Fiorina 1974; Miller and Stokes 1963), or by looking at 
the stated opinions of particular groups of people (Cameron et al. 1996; Chattopadhyay 
and Duflo 2004; Haider-Markel 2007; Minta 2011; Owens 2005; Swers 1998; Vega and 
Firestone 1995). This study does not look at opinion surveys of individuals with varying 
education levels, instead it focuses on two policy areas with disproportionate impact on 
those individuals with lower education levels:  minimum wage and Medicaid. Looking at 
these issue areas will give us an idea of whether these individuals, though not represented 
in terms of literal responsiveness (as seen in Chapter 2), might be attended to more 
appropriately in terms of policy. 
The United States has a relatively long history of legislating a minimum wage. 
The first state minimum wage law was adopted in 1913 in Massachusetts, followed by 
the national minimum wage in 1938 (Leman 1980). While there have been substantial 
changes to these laws in the ensuing years, they have remained in place in the majority of 
the states and at the federal level since their inception (Gow 1986). Throughout these 
changes the objective has stayed the same: to improve the basic standard of living for 
those workers earning the lowest wages, thereby reducing the overall poverty rate (West 
and McKee 1980). 
It is because of the minimum wage’s disproportionate impact on the under-
educated that it is of interest for this dissertation. There is a direct correlation between 
education and income such that individuals with lower levels of education tend to make 
less money (U.S. Department of Labor 2013). Research has indicated that people with a 
68 
 
 
 
high school degree or less are significantly more likely to work at lower paying jobs 
(Appelbaum, Bernhardt, and Murnane 2003; United States Census Bureau 2013). In fact, 
among hourly workers over age 16, more than 11% of those with no high school diploma 
earn the minimum wage, while only 5% of those with a high school diploma and 2% of 
college graduates do (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012). Further, those without a high 
school diploma are more likely to stay in minimum-wage-paying jobs the longest (Smith 
and Vavrichek 1992; Long 1999). And this is if they are even able to find a job at all 
(Neild, Balfanz, and Herzon 2007). 
Of course, while minimum wage policy affects lower-tail earners in general 
(DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996) and those with lower education levels, it also 
affects lower-earning subgroups more specifically. Groups such as teens (Algretto, Dube, 
and Reich 2011; Kosters and Welch 1972; Williams 1993), immigrants (Orrenius and 
Zavodny 2008) and blacks (Kosters and Welch 1972; Williams 1993) tend to make up a 
large proportion of the workforce that earns wages at or close to the minimum.  
Any increase or decrease in a state’s minimum wage would disproportionately 
affect those people, largely uneducated, holding the bulk of the minimum wage jobs. 
Because the objective, as stated above, is to reduce the poverty rate by boosting the 
standard of living for the lowest income-earners, it follows that a state that is being 
responsive of the needs of its less-educated citizens (in addition to teens, immigrants, and 
racial minorities) may respond by increasing the minimum wage. 
Though the impact of changes in the minimum wage on low-income earners has 
been studied extensively, the other side of this coin has not—to what extent does the 
presence in a state of the type of worker who is likely to be a low-wage earner influence 
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the setting of minimum wage policy? There have only been a handful of studies looking 
at the factors for determining the minimum wage. Cox and Oaxaca (1982) examine 
capitalist influence, union power and manufacturing wages to predict wage policy in the 
states. Zavodny (1996) looked at both economic variables and partisan strength, finding 
that both had a relationship with minimum wage change. Finally, Waltman and Pittman 
conducted a study that added variables to account for the ideology of the public to 
variables that had been used previously, finding that ideology was the most predictive of 
the variables for determining state minimum wage policy. 
In the relative dearth of research on the determinants of the minimum wage 
(politics, unions, and cultural factors have all been briefly touched upon in other studies, 
but not explored extensively, see Belot, Boone, and van Ours 2007; Boeri, 2012; Boeri 
and Burda 2009; Brown 2009; Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa 2010 in addition to the 
studies cited above), the varying needs of populations has not been considered. Research 
has indicated that teens and blacks are more likely to fall among the ranks of the low-
income than their older and whiter counterparts and are more likely to be affected by 
minimum wage policy (Neumark and Wascher 1991, 2006), but thus far, no one has 
looked at whether variation in the numbers of teens or blacks in a state impacts the 
formulation of a minimum wage. Similarly, I posit that it is clear that those individuals 
with relatively low levels of education fall into this category as well, and can be studied 
similarly. People with low education levels are relatively more likely to be affected by 
minimum wage policy, so does the presence of the under-educated in a population 
contribute to the determination of the minimum wage? 
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The next policy area that I will address in this chapter is Medicaid. Medicaid, 
created in 1965, is a program financed jointly with state and federal funding and designed 
to provide health care coverage for the nation’s poor (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services). Though held to a framework of federal guidelines, states have a 
considerable amount of flexibility when it comes to the size and scope of the program 
(Cromwell, Hurdle, and Schurman 1987). This leeway has resulted in substantial 
variation in Medicaid programs across the states, both in terms of the services offered and 
in annual expenditures. 
Several different factors have been examined to explain the variation in state-level 
Medicaid spending. For example, Holahan and Cohen (1986) found that wealthier states 
spend more on Medicaid programs than poorer states. States that have higher enrollment 
in the Medicaid program have been shown to spend more on the programs as well 
(Buchanan, Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt 1991). Furthermore, Cromwell, Hurdle and Wedig 
(1986) found that liberal states tend to have higher Medicaid enrollment, thereby 
increasing annual expenditures on the program, a finding that was bolstered by a similar 
finding the following year (Buchanan 1987).  
The majority of Americans who do not have health insurance—63% of them—do 
not have a college degree (United States Census Bureau 2013). The strong negative 
correlation between education and qualifying for/needing Medicaid demonstrates clearly 
that individuals with relatively low levels of education are likely to be disproportionately 
affected by Medicaid spending. Medicaid is designed to provide for health care coverage 
for the nation’s poor, so it is logical to think that policy representativeness of the 
uneducated (who tend to be among the poor), may be reflected in Medicaid spending. 
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3.3 Hypotheses 
While studies of the relationship between education levels and policy outcomes 
has been largely overlooked, socioeconomic status (SES) more generally has been 
studied, and considering the relationship that education has with SES, it is largely from 
this literature that this paper will generate hypotheses, though the implications of this 
research are mixed as well. For example, a 2005 study by James Avery and Mark Peffley 
found that states where lower-class voters had higher rates of turnout during elections, 
lawmakers were less likely to pass highly restrictive welfare eligibility laws (Avery and 
Peffley 2005). Similarly, a series of studies in the 1990s by Hill, Leighley and their 
colleagues found that an electorate with an upper-class bias tended to be associated with 
less-generous welfare benefit policies (Hill and Leighley 1992, 1996; Hill et al. 1995). 
On the other hand, studies like Bartels’ (2008) make it clear that people with lower 
socioeconomic status are not as represented as their richer counterparts. 
Because of the somewhat conflicting findings in the extant literature, the first test 
in this Chapter will examine competing hypotheses.  The Hill et al. and Avery and 
Peffley findings indicate that when there are smaller percentages of lower-class citizens, 
the legislature will be more biased against them. As the proportion of lower-class 
individuals increases, their relative power increases and legislators become more 
responsive to them. This suggests the following hypothesis:  
 
H1a: Higher proportions of uneducated citizens in a state will be associated with 
policies more favorable to those with lower education levels. 
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Conversely, the Bartels line of literature portends a very different outcome. As 
poor individuals are less likely to vote, resulting in lower legislative responsiveness, 
individuals with lower education levels are also less likely to vote. Because legislators are 
aware of this, it is logical to expect that policy may not respond to the needs of those with 
low levels of education much, if at all. The competing hypothesis is: 
 
H1b: Higher proportions of uneducated citizens in a state will be unrelated to 
policies favorable to those with lower education levels. 
 
The next area that I test in this chapter is descriptive representation. Descriptive 
representation refers to how closely those who make up political institutions look like 
those that they represent. For example, an institution would be considered descriptively 
representative of women if the proportion of women serving in that institution matched 
the proportion of women in the population. While the theory of descriptive representation 
(Pitkin 1967) is not concerned with policy outcomes, much of the research that has been 
done since 1967 has been. Substantive representation, which Pitkin defines as 
representatives “acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” 
(Pitkin 1967, p. 209), specifically looks at outcomes. An institution is substantively 
representing women if the policies that they enact reflect the preferences and interests of 
women. 
At times these two representation theories come together—descriptive (or not) 
representation leading to (or not) substantive results. For example, Bullock and 
MacManus (1981) found, in their study of the Mississippi Legislature, that black 
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legislators were more supportive of legislation that was in the interest of the black 
community than white legislators. Similarly, Bratton and Haynie’s (1999) study of six 
different legislatures found that white legislators and black legislators introduced 
different types of legislation, with black legislators more likely to introduce bills that 
benefitted the black community, such as bills concerned with implementation or 
sustaining social welfare programs. Descriptive representation does not always lead to an 
increase in substantive representation, however. Using a race example again, other 
studies have indicated that variation in the proportion of black legislators does not 
influence per-capita expenditures for education, welfare, or healthcare (Nelson 1991; 
Preuhs 2001). 
The substantive effectiveness of descriptive representation also has mixed results 
in studies examining representation by women. Examining “women’s issues” related to 
reproduction, women’s health, and children/family, a 1991 study found that state 
legislatures consisting of more than 20 percent of female legislators do tend to prioritize 
these issues (Thomas 1991, 1994). Later studies (Swers 1998; 2005; Osborn 2012) do not 
disagree, however, they find that there is more nuance to the relationship between female 
representatives and policy outcomes—specifically that gendered representation appears 
secondary to partisan representation. As the entire Republican party (including females) 
has moved to the right, Republican and Democratic women do not share the same 
concepts about the types of public policies that remedy the problems women face in the 
21st century (Osborn 2012).  
Studies on descriptive and substantive representation have largely focused on race 
and gender. There simply has not been the same kind of systematic approach while 
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looking at constituent education levels and legislative education levels. Whether or not 
education represents education in a descriptive or substantive way are empirical 
questions. The American state populations and state legislatures provide substantial 
variation with which we can begin to answer those questions. High school diploma 
attainment in the population varies widely, from a high in Wyoming to a low in Texas. 
Likewise, there is a substantial difference in the educational attainment levels of state 
legislators, ranging from Delaware with the most legislators without a 4-year college 
degree to California with the least. 
Moreover, the literature on descriptive representation, though never looking 
specifically at education, can be applied to this study. Though not all of the studies found 
group-for-group descriptive representation leading to substantive representation, there is 
enough of a relationship to build a foundation for the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Higher proportions of legislators without a 4-year college degree will be 
associated with policies more favorable to those with lower education levels 
  
The descriptive representation literature also indicates that substantive 
representation by partisans may substitute for descriptive substantive representation. For 
example, according to Swain (1995), Democratic lawmakers tend to substantively 
represent the interests of racial minority constituents as well as minority lawmakers. 
Liberal (Democratic) policymakers also tend to support spending on welfare programs 
like Medicaid (Cook and Barrett 1992) and higher state minimum wages (Waltman and 
Pittman 2002). Further, as mentioned before, constituents with lower education levels 
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tend to vote for Democratic candidates for office, thus creating more of an impetus for 
Democratic lawmakers to act in the interest of those individuals. Consequently, this final 
hypothesis is added: 
 
H3: Higher proportions of Democrats will be associated with policies more 
favorable to those with lower education levels. 
 
3.3 Study Design and Measurement 
To test the hypotheses, I analyze state policy and spending in two areas: minimum 
wage and healthcare spending.  
The data for the present analysis are a pooled time series for 49 of the American 
states covering the period from 2000 until 2012. Nebraska is excluded from the analysis 
because I control for legislative partisanship, and the Nebraska legislature is nonpartisan. 
Pooling enables a comparison between states for variations due to fixed differences at 
certain points in time. It also allows me to evaluate the dynamics within states as policy 
responds to changes in independent variables. The dependent variables of interest are per 
capita Medicaid spending, measured in dollars, and the state minimum wage, also 
reported in dollars. If there is a second, lower minimum wage for tipped workers such as 
wait staff, this information was omitted, and the general minimum wage was used. There 
are federal minimum wage regulations in place, so if a state does not have a minimum 
wage or if their stated minimum wage is lower than the federal minimum, I coded that 
state has having the federal minimum. 
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State budget and demographic data were gathered from the U.S. Statistical 
Abstract and supplemented with information about each state’s legislature, includ ing 
racial, gender, party, and education demographics gathered from the National Conference 
of State Legislatures and Project Vote Smart data archives (see Table 3.1 for descriptive 
statistics and 3.2 for a correlation table). These legislature attributes are used for two 
purposes, as controls and to test for descriptive representation and partisan effects. The 
extant research in the areas of party (e.g. Dye 1984; Erikson 1971; Garand 1985; 
Jennings 1979), gender (e.g. Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Pearson 2001; Seltzer, 
Newman, and Leighton 1997; Swers 2005), and race (e.g. Cameron et al. 1996; Guinier 
1994; Owens 2005) indicate that the makeup of legislatures in terms of these 
characteristics may have an effect on policy outcomes. Moreover, the implications of 
these effects is such that variation of these attributes may show us if legislator education 
levels, which have not been studied extensively, serve as a predictor for policy or if the 
constituent demographics or legislature characteristics in a given state may be driving the 
relationship.  
In order to ensure that the dependent variables are not simply being driven by 
state wealth, or simply poverty, these variables are also included. State Gross Domestic 
Product (using data from the U.S. Statistical Abstract) was calculated per capita to enable 
state by state comparisons. Additionally, the percentage of the state’s population living 
below the federally established poverty line (also collected from the U.S. Statistical 
Abstract) was included. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
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Table 3.2: Correlations of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
 
 Pooled-time series is a powerful technique, but given the nature of the data it is 
employed on, it often produces complicated, correlated error structures that violate the 
basic assumptions of ordinary least squares. Of primary concern in pooled models are 
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation, and various estimation techniques have been 
suggested to control for these problems (Sayrs 1989). To address these issues, I lag the 
dependent variables and use a Prais-Winsten OLS estimator with panel corrected 
(Durbin-Watson) standard errors to account for the nonspherical error terms that are 
typical in pooled analyses (see Beck and Katz 1995). Such unit effects were expected in 
this data set because of the unique characteristics of individual states. Lagging the 
dependent variable by a year and including it amongst the independent accounts for the 
autoregressive serial correlation between years that was expected, and found, in the data.  
Medicaid 
Spending
Minimum 
Wage
Average 
Legislator 
Education
Percent 
Legislature 
GOP
Percent 
Legislature 
Black
Percent 
Legislature 
Female
GSP Per 
Capita
State 
Poverty 
Percent
State 
Percent 
Black
State 
Percent 
Hispanic
Percent 
of State 
Without 
Diploma
State Union 
Membership
Medicaid Spending 1.0000
Minimum Wage .5353* 1.0000
(.0000)
Average Legislator Education .1448* .2110* 1.0000
(.0002) (.0000)
Percent Legislature GOP -.4402* -.3397* -.2732* 1.0000
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
Percent Legislature Black .0185 -.1264* .1932* -.1429* 1.0000
(.6387) (.0013) (.0000) (.0003)
Percent Legislature Female .0565 .2906* .1165* -.1436 -.3423* 1.0000
(.1500) (.0000) (.0029) (.0003) (.0000)
GSP Per Capita .4360* .6481* .2634* -.2847* -.0496 .3295* 1.0000
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) .2066 .0000
State Poverty Percent .2604* .1555* .1687* -.1971* .3378* -.3250* -.2290* 1.0000
(.0000) (.0001) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
State Percent Black .0620 -.1382* .1122* -.1684* .9384* -.3621* -.0526 .3420* 1.0000
(.1143) (.0004) (.0042) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) .1803 (.0000)
State Percent Hispanic -.0081 .1706* .3998* -.0653 -.0712 .3561* 1840* .2009 -.1160* 1.0000
(.8358) (.0000) (.0000) (.0995) (.0699) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0031)
Percent of State Without Diploma -.0161 -.2719* .1703* -.1980* .5142* -.3748* -.3921* .5587* .5220* .2628* 1.0000
(.6827) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) *.0000)
State Union Membership .2790* .2287* .1409 -.2712* -.1707* .3127* .2854* -.3624* -.2490* -.0019 -.2424 1.0000
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.9608) (.0000)
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 While these corrections address prominent statistical challenges of pooled 
analyses, it is important to note that they necessarily change the interpretation of the 
results. Lagging the dependent variable means that the impact of the independent 
variables are spread across time. Essentially, this means that this is a model of 
differences. The lag controls for all the potential causes of the dependent variables at time 
t, leaving the independent variables the job of trying to account for changes between t-1 
and time t (Wood 1992).  
 
3.4 Results: Minimum Wage  
The results presented in Table 3.3 provide no support for Hypothesis 1a, 2, or 3. As 
expected, the dominant regressor is the lagged dependent variable, which has a 
coefficient greater than .8. This highlights the powerful role of incrementalism, or even 
inertia, in state minimum wage law, as the minimum wage at time t-1 significantly 
predicted the minimum wage at time t. 
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Table 3.3: Determinants of Minimum Wage in the States, 2000-2012 (Corrected Model)  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable     Coefficient (Corrected Standard Error)  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Average Legislator Education      .105 (.172) 
Percent Legislature GOP      .0003 (.003) 
Percent Legislature Black      .418 (2.188) 
Percent Legislature Female      .003 (.006) 
GSP Per Capita       .00002 (.0000009) 
State Poverty Percent       -.011 (.013) 
State Percent Black       -.020 (.019) 
State Percent Hispanic      .006 (.004) 
Percent of State without Diploma     .0006 (.016) 
State Union Membership      .006 (.007) 
Lagged Minimum Wage      .873** (.043)  
  
Constant        .024 (.719) 
R2         .74* 
Number of Observations      636 
________________________________________________________________________ 
*p<.05 **p<.01 
  
 In Hypothesis 1a I predicted that higher proportions of the population with low 
education levels would lead to higher state minimum wages, as an increase in those 
without a high school diploma would be associated with an increase in the number of 
people relying on low-wage jobs. Holding the other variables in the model constant, this 
does not pan out. Instead, Hypothesis 1b is supported, as there is no relationship between 
population education levels and state minimum wage level in these data. 
 Next, I hypothesized that legislators with lower average education levels 
themselves would be sensitive to the needs of constituents with low education levels and 
81 
 
 
 
would thus be associated with higher minimum wages. I, again, found no support for this 
hypothesis. Nor did I find the expected relationship between legislative party dominance 
and minimum wage. I expected that more liberal legislatures would set higher minimum 
wages, but failed to find this to be true in the data.  
Other than the lagged dependent variable, not one other independent variable in 
the model contributes significantly to the model. The legislature demographics, gender 
and racial, that tend to influence policy outcomes are indistinguishable from zero, using a 
traditional p<.05 alpha level indicator.  Similarly, the population demographic variables 
do not contribute significantly to the model, so the variation of black and Hispanic 
citizens in a state has no effect, nor does the variation in the populations’ poverty or 
education levels, when holding all of the other variables in the model constant.  
If the characteristics of neither the population nor the legislature provide 
sufficient explanations for state minimum wage policy, perhaps simple economics would 
provide an alternate explanation. The results show, however, that this is not the case.  The 
Gross State Product variable, like all of the others, is not a significant indicator in the 
model. Essentially, state wealth is not driving state minimum wage policy in this model.   
 Though using a corrected model with a lagged dependent variable is one way to 
deal with the problems found in pooled time series analyses, it is possible that the lagged 
variable is soaking up too much of the variance in this model and suppressing the effects 
of the independent variables. In order to test this, I ran an uncorrected OLS model and 
left out the lagged minimum wage variable (Table 3.4).  
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Table 3.4: Determinants of Minimum Wage in the States, 2000-2012 (Uncorrected Fixed 
Effects Model)  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable      Coefficient (Standard Error)  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Average Legislator Education       .729** (.241)  
Percent Legislature GOP      -.002 (.002)  
Percent Legislature Black9      1.53 (2.003)  
Percent Legislature Female       .010 (.008)  
GSP Per Capita        .0007** (.0006)  
State Poverty Percent        .128** (.015)  
State Percent Hispanic       .194** (.023)  
Percent of State without Diploma     -.039** (.016) 
State Union Membership       .014 (.021)  
Constant        -1.682 (.941) 
R2          .74** 
Number of Observations       636 
________________________________________________________________________ 
*p<.05 **p<.01 
 
In this uncorrected model, we see that variables that were suppressed by the 
lagged minimum wage variable become significant. Of the legislature characteristics, 
legislator education level has a positive relationship with minimum wage such that an 
increase in educational attainment is associated with a $.73 increase in the state minimum 
wage. This is the opposite of what I had hypothesized—that legislators with less 
education would be more sympathetic to the plight of others with relatively low 
educational attainment and thus work to increase the minimum wage. The other 
                                                                 
9 The variables for percent population black and percent legislature black are highly correlated at .9384. 
Due to the risk of multicollinearity problems stemming from this relationship, the population variable was 
dropped from the uncorrected models.  
83 
 
 
 
legislature variable of interest was partisanship, which remains non-significant in this 
model. 
Hypothesis 1 asked about the relationship between the population with lower 
education levels, expecting that either larger numbers in the population would be 
associated with higher minimum wages or that there would be no relationship 
whatsoever. Instead, this model finds a negative relationship. For every one percentage 
point increase in the population with no high school diploma, we see a $.04 drop in the 
minimum wage. Thus, neither Hypothesis 1a nor Hypothesis 1b are supported by this 
model. 
 
3.5 Results: Medicaid Spending 
 The results from the corrected model (presented in Table 3.5) for predicting 
Medicaid spending, though containing more significant variables than the corrected 
minimum wage model, indicate no support for the hypotheses. As expected, the lagged 
Medicaid spending variable contributes significantly, indicating again that 
incrementalism explains some of the variation in this policy area. 
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Table 3.5: Determinants of Medicaid Spending in the States, 2000-2012 (Corrected 
Model)  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable      Coefficient (Corrected Standard 
Error)  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Average Legislator Education      3.491 (27.076) 
Percent Legislature GOP      -.118 (.450) 
Percent Legislature Black      -532.561* (167.992) 
Percent Legislature Female      1.135 (.954) 
GSP Per Capita       .002 (.002) 
State Poverty Percent       6.993* (3.377) 
State Percent Black       3.629* (1.460) 
State Percent Hispanic      -1.229 (.907) 
Percent of State without Diploma     2.046 (2.631) 
State Union Membership      3.318* (1.469) 
Lagged Medicaid Spending      .892* (.053) 
Constant        -83.146 (136.216) 
R2         .87* 
Number of Observations      636 
________________________________________________________________________ 
*p<.05 
  
 Hypothesis 1a expected that higher proportions of the population with low 
education levels would lead to increased Medicaid spending, as an increase in those 
without a high school diploma would be associated with the need for increased 
entitlement spending. Holding the other variables in the model constant, this does not 
appear to be the case. While the percentage of the states’ populations under the poverty 
line does predict Medicaid spending, and in the expected direction, percent without a 
high school degree does not, thus providing no support for this hypothesis, instead 
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lending credence to the alternative hypothesis that because legislators have less to gain 
from people with lower education levels, they will not be responsive to them.  
  Next, I hypothesized that legislators with lower average education levels 
themselves would be sensitive to the needs of constituents with low education levels and 
would thus be associated with higher levels of Medicaid spending. I, again, found no 
support for this hypothesis. Similarly, I expected that more liberal legislatures would 
spend more money on entitlement programs like Medicaid, but failed to find this to be 
true in the data. In fact, of the legislator demographic variables included in the model, the 
only one that significantly predicted Medicaid spending was the percentage of the 
legislature that is black. Somewhat surprisingly, an increase in black legislators is 
associated with a decrease in Medicaid spending, likely indicating not that black 
legislators tend to decrease Medicaid spending, but that the states that elect more black 
legislators (such as states with higher percentages of the population that identify as black, 
note the correlation in Table 3.2) are the same states that spend relatively smaller 
amounts on programs like Medicaid for other reasons. While this is certainly a fruitful 
topic for further analysis, for the purposes of the present dissertation, of more importance 
is the fact that neither Hypothesis 2 nor 3 were supported by the data. 
 Similar to my examination of minimum wage policy, I next tested for the effect 
that the lagged dependent variable might have been having on the other independent 
variables (Table 3.6). The uncorrected model does not provide additional support for any 
of the hypotheses, and indeed tells a disturbing story in terms of the representation of 
those with lower education levels. 
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Table 3.6: Determinants of Medicaid Spending in the States, 2000-2012 (Uncorrected 
Fixed Effects Model)  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable      Coefficient (Standard Error)  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Average Legislator Education         -52.386 (62.051)    
Percent Legislature GOP         -.575 (.430) 
Percent Legislature Black          282.716 (515.527)  
Percent Legislature Female          8.704** (2.052)  
GSP Per Capita           .0173** (.002) 
State Poverty Percent           16.167** (3.804) 
State Percent Hispanic          37.711** (5.836) 
Percent of State without Diploma        -25.039** (4.219)  
State Union Membership         -1.201 (5.446)  
Constant           158.724 (242.603) 
R2          .68** 
Number of Observations       636 
________________________________________________________________________ 
*p<.05 **p<.01 
 
 Neither Hypothesis 1a nor 1b finds backing in this model. While I had expected to 
find that either legislators would be responsive to their poorly-educated constituents or 
ignore them completely, similar to the uncorrected findings for minimum wage policy, 
there is a negative relationship between Medicaid spending that the percent of the state’s 
population lacking a high school diploma. For each percentage increase in adults without 
a high school degree, state Medicaid spending decreases by $25. Also contrary to the 
hypotheses, neither the presence of legislators who have lower levels of education 
themselves nor Democratic legislators increases Medicaid spending.  
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3.6 Discussion and Implications 
  
Americans who have not graduated from high school are far more likely to be 
financially disadvantaged than their better-educated counterparts. They end up working 
in many of the minimum wage jobs, and are disproportionately more dependent on 
government welfare programs like subsidized healthcare. This chapter indicates, 
however, that even though the uneducated have distinct interests in these areas, they are 
not being substantively responded to by their state lawmakers.  
State minimum wage has a significant bivariate relationship with the hypothesized 
variables, though not all of them are in the expected direction. There is a correlation 
between the percentage of the population with no high school degree such that as that 
percentage increases, minimum wage decreases (r(588)=-.2719, p<.001). This is contrary 
to the direction that I had hypothesized. Similarly, there is a positive bivariate 
relationship between minimum wage and legislator education level (r(588)=.2110, 
p<.001). Again, this was unexpected, as I had hypothesized that lower legislator 
education levels would be associated with higher minimum wages. The only bivariate 
correlation that panned out as expected was legislature partisanship. There was a 
relationship between minimum wage and partisanship such that an increase in the number 
of Republican legislators in a legislature was associated with lower minimum wages 
(r(588)=-.3397, p<.001). 
 The present study, however, did not find support for the hypothesized relationship 
between any of the variables of interest and state minimum wage in the Durbin-Watson 
corrected Prais-Winsten model. The corrected models both seem to have the problem of 
the lagged dependent variable greedily snatching up all of the variance, leaving nothing 
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for the other independent variables to work with. Understanding the endemic risks 
involved, I will focus my discussion here on the uncorrected models.   
I first looked at competing hypotheses, expecting either a positive relationship 
between the population in a state with no high school degree and minimum wage or no 
relationship at all. Instead, I found a negative relationship—as the number of the 
undereducated in a state’s population increases, the minimum wage decreases. This 
finding, while normatively concerning, is perhaps not entirely surprising. When there is a 
larger population of people willing (or forced by circumstance) to take minimum wage 
jobs, there may not be a need to increase their pay. These people are going to work at 
these jobs regardless, so why burden the business owners? On the other hand, the yearly 
salary of someone working full-time at the federal minimum wage is $14,500, which 
doesn’t even account for the fact that many minimum wage jobs do not offer full-time 
hours. The larger the population that works these jobs because they are not qualified for 
much else, the larger the population will be who are struggling to get by on very little 
money, which may end up costing the state more on the back end.  
 Moreover, contrasting with Hypothesis 2, legislatures with lower average 
education levels do not set higher minimum wages, indicating that education does not 
serve as an area in which descriptive representation is occurring. In fact, I found the 
inverse—legislators with higher relative educational attainment are associated with 
higher minimum wage policies. The less-educated are not being represented in 
accordance with their presence, nor are they being represented descriptively. This may 
make sense in light of the earlier discussion in this dissertation of the lack of entitativity, 
or group cohesion, amongst people with similar education levels. Marx (1904) posited 
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that individuals facing oppression have to be aware that the oppression is systematic and 
group-based. Awareness of group membership and the common bond are prerequisites of 
any action to counter the oppression. If, as Schlozman and Verba assert, problems such as 
poverty and low education levels are seen as individual crosses to bear rather than 
systematic issues, not only will individuals in these situations fail to act together toward 
solutions, legislators who have overcome their low education levels and achieved elected 
office will not see uneducated constituents as versions of themselves that they have a 
responsibility to represent and protect. While it may occur to a black legislator to work on 
issues that disproportionately affect black constituents, this does not hold true for less-
educated legislators. The fact that increased legislator education is associated with higher 
state minimum wages is something for future research. 
 Also, surprisingly, the partisan makeup of the legislature is not predictive of 
minimum wage policy. Although there was a significant bivariate relationship, and the 
previous literature in the areas of minimum wage determination, policy support, and 
statistical discrimination led me to expect to see support for Hypothesis 3, this was not 
the case in this study. Holding all of the other variables in the model constant caused the 
relationship that was seen in the correlation table to disappear.  
This finding was especially unexpected in light of the current national discussion 
of an increased federal minimum wage. By all indications, it appears that Democratic 
lawmakers are the ones that are driving this movement. On the national level, many of 
the vocal proponents of increasing the minimum wage are Democrats, from President 
Obama to legislators such as Elizabeth Warren, Dick Durbin, and George Miller. Further, 
several states recently passed legislation to increase the state minimum wage moving 
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forward10. The list of states doing so include mostly east and west coast states known for 
being “blue” (Washington, Oregon, California, New York, Vermont, Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, and New Jersey), with states with more of a mixed partisan voting history 
(Colorado, Florida, Ohio) and “red” states (Montana, Arizona, and Missouri) numbering 
far fewer. At face value, it appears as if partisanship matters. Controlling for the other 
variables in the model, however, indicates that partisanship may not matter as much as 
legislator education, state wealth, or population demographics. 
 Next, I looked at Medicaid spending as the policy outcome variable of interest. As 
the correlation table indicates, there is no bivariate relationship between the adult 
population without a high school diploma and Medicaid spending (r(588)=-.0161, 
p=.6827). There is a significant correlation between legislator educational attainment and 
Medicaid spending, though not in the hypothesized direction—increased education is 
associated with increased Medicaid spending (r(588)=.1448, p<.001). There is also a 
strong inverse bivariate relationship between Medicaid spending and proportion of the 
legislature that is Republican (r(588)=-.4402, p<.001), providing initial support for 
Hypothesis 3. 
 The uncorrected fixed effects model for Medicaid spending tells a story similar to 
that with the minimum wage outcome variable. Neither Hypothesis 1a nor 1b are 
supported by these data—the variable for the percentage of the state’s population without 
a high school diploma contributes to the model significantly with a negative coefficient. 
Not only are legislators not responsive to their less-educated constituents, it appears that 
legislators may be actively working against them. This finding is of particular interest 
                                                                 
10 As these laws were passed after data was collected for the present dissertation, it is not included in the 
formal analysis. 
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because the included variable for poverty predicts Medicaid spending in the expected 
direction, larger proportions of the population who fall under the poverty line are 
associated with higher Medicaid spending. This is logical in that one must meet certain 
low-income guidelines for Medicaid eligibility; if a state has fewer impoverished 
residents, that state will not need to spend as much covering the medical care of the poor. 
Holding poverty constant in the time-series model, however, reveals this tricky inverse 
relationship between Medicaid spending and population educational attainment. 
As both minimum wage policy and Medicaid spending show this negative 
relationship, it seems clear that legislators are not being responsive to the policy needs of 
their less-educated constituents. It seems unlikely, however, that legislators are 
deliberately going out of their way to “stick it to” the uneducated, especially in light of 
the fact that Medicaid spending does appear to be responsive to poverty rates. An 
alternative explanation may come from looking at the reverse relationship: could it 
simply be that low minimum wages and low Medicaid spending lead to higher high 
school attrition?  
Socioeconomic status has long been tied to dropping out of high school (Battin-
Pearson, Newcomb, Abbott, and Hill 2000; Ensminger and Slusarcick 1992; Heckman 
and LaFontaine 2010; Bridgeland, Dijulio and Morison 2006). Along with race, academic 
achievement, deviance, pregnancy, and antisocial peers, financial trouble at home is a 
leading cause of dropout. In a study that surveyed and interviewed actual adolescents 
who withdrew from high school before graduating, a full 32% of these individuals 
reported that they had dropped out in order to get a job and contribute to their family’s 
finances. An additional 22% reported that they had withdrawn to help their families 
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(Bridgeland et al. 2006). In 2011, the U.S. Department of Education found the dropout 
rate of students living in low-income families was close to five times greater than the rate 
of their peers hailing from high-income families (7.5% versus 1.4%) (U.S. Department of 
Education 2011). 
Minimum wages that are not enough to fully support a family and relatively high 
thresholds for Medicaid leading to increased medical expenses for some impoverished 
families can certainly cause a financial strain, making it more likely that these families 
need every able-bodied household member to contribute to the family’s income. If 
teenagers are quitting school in order to contribute to the family’s bottom line, state 
governments are doing a disservice, not only to the poor, but to the undereducated as 
well. When students drop out of school to work to help support their families, they 
become more likely to end up amongst the population that works in minimum wage jobs 
and that qualifies for Medicaid. Then, if the minimum wage is low and they don’t qualify 
for Medicaid, they may end up in the same poverty situation in which they began.  
Further, it does not appear that legislator education levels nor their party 
affiliation serves to increase Medicaid spending, thus making these legislators more 
responsive to those who are most likely to need it. Again here, it does not look as if 
legislators with lower educational levels feel a sense of being “the same” as those with 
lower educational levels in his or her constituency. And while there is evidence that 
partisanship makes up for descriptive representation in some areas (namely women’s 
issues), that does not seem to be the case in these data. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are not 
supported. 
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Policies that states and school districts make regarding dropout rates often focus 
on the school environment—striving for smaller classes, individual attention, parental 
involvement, and tracking (Bridgeland et al. 2006). While these are all good things to 
improve and have been shown to help decrease the dropout rate, they do not address the 
systematic link between poverty and low educational attainment. Simply put, poor 
individuals are more likely to need to drop out of school, which in turn often leads to 
future poverty, which leads to future generations of students dropping out of school. In 
this way, policy is not being responsive to individuals with low educational attainment. 
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Chapter 4: Legislative Perspectives on Representation and 
Responsiveness 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to better understand representation— in terms of 
both service responsiveness and policy responsiveness— and its relationship with 
education from the legislative perspective. The principle method herein is interviewing 6 
state legislators in different states, a mixture of Republicans and Democrats, males and 
females, and senators and representatives. Of course, the study of representation in state 
legislators is a very large assignment. Ideally it would involve in-depth surveys and 
interviews, and observations of all of the nearly 7,500 legislators, or at least a 
scientifically representative sample. Unfortunately, the time and resources for such an 
undertaking are not available at this time. The logistics of time and travel funds required 
that I was limited to six states: Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Nebraska, Kansas, 
and Delaware. The states were selected largely out of convenience—I have some 
connection to each of these state legislatures. The connections range from knowing the 
state legislator personally to having friends who work as staffers and aides in the offices. 
Though this is certainly a convenience sample, the mix of partisan affiliation, gender, 
legislative experience, legislative capacity and chamber is diverse. Indeed, the sample 
contains 3 males and 3 females, 4 Democrats and 2 Republicans, 3 house members, 2 
senate members, and 1 unicameral member, and a range of 4 years of legislative 
experience to 35 years. 
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 Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that Americans with lower relative levels of 
education may not be receiving representation by their government to the extent that 
those with higher levels are. I have shown this both in terms of literal responsiveness and 
policy responsiveness. These studies, however, were executed in an manner such that the 
perspective of the legislator was not considered. As mentioned previously, legislators are 
constrained by many things, including their reelection hopes, the rules of the governing 
body to which they belong, and, of course, time and resources available. This chapter will 
examine how these constraints affect the manner in which these legislators are able to 
represent their constituents, and more specifically, how they represent constituents with 
lower relative education levels. 
 
4.2 Communication, Casework, and Priorities 
Congressional research in the 1970s highlighted the fact that lawmaking is but 
one aspect of the job as legislators see it, and that much of the non-lawmaking activity 
has important electoral consequences (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977; Fenno 1978). In 
1982, when Malcolm Jewell interviewed state legislators, he found that casework, which 
is a common form of service responsiveness, makes up a large portion of the legislators’ 
jobs. As one legislator stated, 
About 98 percent of my job concerns casework. Mostly it is jobs that they 
want, sometimes food stamps or housing, but usually jobs. As long as you 
return the call or letter and try to do something, people will appreciate it, 
and it will help you politically. If I get a job for someone, sooner or later 
someone else in the family will call about a job. If you don’t do constituency 
work, you don’t help yourself… (p. 3). 
 
Later research indicates that while the “98 percent” quoted above may have been 
hyperbole, state legislators do, in fact, spend a considerable about of time on casework 
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(Freeman and Richardson 1994, 1996; Nelson 1991; Thomas 1992; Ellickson and 
Whistler 2001; Freeman and Richardson 1994, 1996). These requests from constituents 
vary from simple questions to requests for assistance navigating bureaucratic red tape to 
job-search help to intervention in local disputes (Freeman and Richardson 1994). One 
legislator I interviewed reported that “[they] spend at least 10-20 hours a week”11 on 
casework, while another (in a more professionalized legislative environment) says, “it 
varies from week to week, for sure, but I would say that at minimum [they] do about 25-
30 hours and [their] assistant does another 30”. The former reports receiving around 10-
15 communications a day from their constituents, and the latter roughly twice that. 
Furthermore, the legislators who I interviewed indicated that they prefer to do the 
majority of constituent communication themselves, even when there is staff assistance 
available. One stated, “My legislative assistant responds to the email request and calls me 
if I need to contact them directly. Normally she calls me and I give her the response over 
the phone and she emails them back”. Another “like[s] to see all of the emails so that 
[they] know if anything is out of the ordinary…those [they] like to do [themselves].” Still 
another says, “Even though [they are] in a highly populated district, this is one thing that 
[they] always do instead of passing it off to an aide. This way [they] can make sure that 
[they are] getting the most contact with the voters that is possible”. 
 Much of this dissertation is dependent on the hypothesis that state legislators hope 
to profit electorally from their representation activities, and there is certainly evidence 
that this is the case, from the scholarly literature since the days of Mayhew and Fenno, as 
well as the experiments in my earlier chapters and the interviews conducted for this 
                                                                 
11 As all of these interviews were conducted with the promise of anonymity, I will not be providing formal 
citations for the quotes from the interviews. All of the interviews were conducted personally by the author.  
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chapter. In 1987, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina asked whether members (of Congress) 
“believe constituency service has electoral payoffs” (Cain et al., 1987, p. 78). The subject 
of their study is the U.S. Congress, however it is not unrealistic to assume that state 
legislators act in similar ways, especially considering that they too are concerned with 
reelection (Francis and Baker 1986; Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000) and often display 
“progressive ambition” toward becoming members of Congress (Schlesinger 1966; 
Francis and Baker 1986; Berkman 1994 Maestas 2000, 2003; Maestas, Fulton, Maisel 
and Stone 2006). Cain and his colleagues found that the perception is indeed that service 
activities have electoral efficacy. In fact, a survey of congressional staff assistants 
revealed that only 2 of 102 believed that service had “no significant electoral effect” 
(Cain et al. 1987, p. 78). 
 The state legislators interviewed for this dissertation agree: “I was elected to make 
laws, sure, but the people really expect you to actually do work for them. That kind of 
casework is my biggest responsibility and it really does make a difference come election 
time,” one legislator reported. They were not alone, “Constituent service is more 
important than legislation because a lot of people don’t really know about the specifics of 
laws but you better believe that they know whether you were able to help them when they 
called in,” said another. “It would be stupid to think that doing service work wouldn’t 
impact elections,” another stated, “It is really the biggest advantage you get for being an 
incumbent.”  
 This is certainly not to say that reelection is the only motivating factor for 
constituent service. As Cain et al. (1987) stated, “Only the most hardened cynic maintains 
that winning votes is the sole motivation for service” (pgs. 84-85). They posit that there is 
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a “general notion that elected officials have duties associated with their positions, which 
they fulfill as a matter of obligation” (pg. 86). This sense of duty, or obligation, was also 
a running theme in the interviews that I conducted. When asked about why they devoted 
so much time to constituent service, one legislator replied, “Well, the way I see it is that it 
is my job. The people expect that they can call my office for help, and if we don’t do it, 
who will?” An aide from a different office echoed this sentiment, “People need help with 
things and they expect us to do it. So we do.”  
 Summarily, state legislators and their staffers devote a substantial amount of time 
and energy to constituent service, which places Chapter 2 of this dissertation in an 
important light. Legislators and their staffers believe casework to be important, both for 
reelection purposes and because it is simply part of the job. If this is the case, though, 
why were response rates to the experimental emails so low, particularly for those 
“constituents” with lower education levels? The answer that I had discussed was that 
there is simply not enough time to do everything, and someone has to suffer the 
consequences of that. As Malcolm Jewell pointed out in 1982, “There are two competing 
job descriptions that are irreconcilable (at least in terms of time available)” (p.2). He is 
referring to the fact that even though there are only so many hours in a day and days in a 
week, representatives are expected to meet the demands of policymaking and constituent 
service (and possibly even campaigning for the next election). Eulau (1978) also spoke to 
this conundrum, saying,  
The circumstances of modern government are such that neither 
responsibility nor responsiveness can be assured through the 
technique of representation. Despite all the oratory of the politicians, 
they cannot possibly be responsive, in the traditional sense, to 
individual constituents whose numbers are in the hundreds of 
thousands or millions, whose interests are enormously diverse and 
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whose understanding of the complexities of public policy is 
minimal” (pgs. 49-50). 
 
 
 Eulau is referring to the United States Congress, but there is no reason to believe 
that the same doesn’t hold true at the state level. State legislative workload varies 
widely from state to state, ranging from effectively full-time legislatures like 
California and Massachusetts, to Montana which only have ninety day sessions every 
other year. Many of the states limit the length of their sessions either constitutionally 
or statutorily, though many individual legislators report working much more than they 
are technically supposed to (Kurtz, Moncrief, Niemi and Powell 2006). 
 The implication of these time pressures is that something has got to give. 
Legislators necessarily have to prioritize items on their to-do lists, meaning 
something—or someone—is going to receive little or no attention. In Chapter 2, I 
discussed the theory of statistical discrimination, an idea upheld by my field 
experiments, but one that is more difficult to uncover in conversations with the 
legislators themselves. To recap, statistical discrimination, in this context at least, is 
when a legislator is aware—either consciously or subconsciously—of their likely 
voters, and when prioritizing the items to which they will be devoting time attention, 
focus on these people. As education is positively related to political participation, 
those individuals with lower perceived or stated educational attainment would be 
more likely to suffer the consequences of statistical discrimination and not have their 
request responded to. 
 While this is logical maximizing behavior, the representatives themselves are 
reluctant to admit to it—at least when they are talking about their own behavior and 
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the protocols of their offices. “We always respond to each and every inquiry that 
comes in to our office, in the order that they come in,” reports one legislator. Another 
says, “Every constituent is a potential vote, so I make each one a priority and don’t 
ever leave anyone out.” 
 Asking the representatives to speculate about how other offices conduct business 
leads to slightly different answers, however. Though not all of them were willing to 
speculate, the ones that did provided answers that were very much in line with the 
findings in Chapter 2. One legislator, while denying it occurring in their office, says, 
“I think that people who are only concerned about getting reelected would definitely 
spend the most time on people who would vote for them. In this office we are more 
concerned about good policy though.” “I can see how in other offices, people might 
spend more time dealing with the people who are, say, big donors or something,” says 
one staffer. He continued, “If I were to do something like that, I think I would maybe 
deal first with the people who are the most likely to complain the loudest. You know 
the type—the ones who write op-eds in to the paper and stuff.” While this is not 
exactly in line with the expectations of Mayhew or Fenno, it is not entirely 
unreasonable either. If reelection is the ultimate goal of these legislators, one way of 
going about that, of course, is to cater to the likely voters. Another way, though, 
would be to quell the voices of the dissenters so that they are not as likely to dissuade 
other potential voters and supporters.  
 Research supports the idea that legislators and their staff members may bias their 
attention toward both supporters and the “squeaky wheel” types. Cain, Ferejohn and 
Fiorina (1987) addressed this idea as well, stating that “the notion that constituency 
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service is a duty sometimes shades into another electoral incentive, one which 
emphasizes the negative consequences of neglect rather than the positive 
consequences of attention” (pg. 86). There is evidence, for instance, that “legislative 
elites’ reliance on the accessibility heuristic systematically favors information about 
certain constituents over other, equally relevant constituents. The information that is 
most accessible to legislative elites is information made salient by financial 
contributions or made familiar through constituency- initiated contact with the 
legislative office” (Miller 2009, p. 864). Similarly, Rosner (2007) divides members of 
constituencies into groups: squeaky wheel, collector, advisor, random, and 
bellwether. He asserts that certain groups, including members of the squeaky wheel 
group, receive legislative attention and influence the actions of the legislator. There 
has not, however, been a substantial amount of research done on this topic and it 
certainly deserves further attention in the future. 
 Campaign contributors and volunteers tend to have higher educational attainment, 
as do writers of op-eds (Sommer and Maycroft 2008) and letters to the editor 
(McCluskey and Hmielowski 2011). While none of the interviewees would admit to 
discriminating themselves, the fact that when asked to speculate about other offices 
they pointed to supporters and squeaky wheels as being more worthy of attention 
speaks loudly about the role of education in service responsiveness.  
  
4.4 Constituents and Communication, Topics and Quality 
While remaining reluctant to admit that they may treat different constituents 
differently, government offices, including state legislative offices do acknowledge 
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that there are differences in the quality of communications that they receive, and that 
they develop a pretty good sense of the education of the writer. As one legislator put 
it, “[the communication that he receives is] either perfect or very poor. It’s pretty easy 
to tell by the spelling what kind of person I am dealing with—you know, if they went 
to college, or are from a more disadvantaged neighborhood”. A staffer in a different 
state agreed, “Most of the policy emails are pretty well written, but some of the angry 
letters are not well-written at all. And there is a lot more variety with the requests for 
help with stuff; some of the people who write to ask for help really don’t seem to 
write very well at all…I am pretty sure that a lot of these people didn’t go to school 
beyond high school, if that”.  
Worries that the emails that I used for the field experiments in Chapter 2 were 
excessively extreme in terms of quality were seemingly unfounded. Emails include 
the extremely well-written such as these12: 
 
Representative XXX,  
 
I understand that you received a letter from Mayor XXX in support 
of the proposed gas tax increase. This proposal is disturbing to 
me, because the hardships stemming from this "fair" tax are 
staggering.  
 
I live in a section of XXX with many retired citizens. They pride 
themselves on living frugally, and making do despite the economic 
ups and downs. I would hate to see a gas tax increase, since it would 
make it more difficult for them to afford the dignity of driving 
themselves around. A higher gas tax would also impact the cost of 
food for these individuals. Since taxes rarely go back down after 
                                                                 
12 In 2013, the Utah State Legislature began posting their email correspondence for anyone to see on the 
legislature’s website on an online repository. Examples of communication between these state legislators 
and their constituents can be found at http://le.utah.gov/publicweb/menu.jsp. This program is voluntary, so 
the emails that have been chosen by the legislators to include in the repository skew toward the well-written 
and, as of this writing, include only policy-oriented emails. 
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being raised, this attempt to fund road work could easily result in a 
big increase of permanently welfare-dependent households. The net 
result would not be positive for my city, county or state. 
 
Please stand strong against this increase!  
Thank you, 
 
Constituent XXX 
and 
Dear Senator XXX,  
 
Thanks to both of you for your family friendly work at the 
Legislature. As your constituent, I want to share my concern about 
the overturning of Amendment 3. The entire nation will now watch 
how XXX defends traditional (and voter approved) marriage. I 
encourage you to support the expenditure of funds to hire 
experienced attorneys to defend Amendment XXX.  
 
In light of same-sex marriage now occurring in XXX, I would like 
to know if you, or any of your colleagues that you know of, are 
planning to sponsor any religious liberty bills?  
 
I also ask you to NOT support upcoming non-discrimination 
legislation sponsored by Sen. XXX. At first thought, it sounds like 
a good idea, but it's not. This legislation would pit sexual rights 
against First Freedoms (religion, speech, right to make a living, 
conscience). In communities and states that have adopted non-
discrimination laws similar to that proposed by Sen. XXX, 
lawsuits, fines, threat of jail time and ruined businesses are the 
"unintended" and very unfair consequences. Please see 
FairToAll.org for more information and links to stories of real 
people who have been hurt by non-discrimination laws. 
 
Thanks so much for your time and energy to continue XXX’s long 
and strong history of traditional family as the foundation of our 
thriving society. 
 
Best Regards, 
Constituent XXX 
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Emails received also include very poorly written ones like this: 
To XXX 
I am wrighting to you as a very concerned person who currently is 
on Medicade. I have read what is being Cut from the Medicade 
Program and am ver conderned about these cuts. I currently take 
more than 10 proscriptions every day as i have a lot of different 
health problems in your proposal on the Medicade cuts from what I 
understand You do not want to let anybody have NO more than 10 
proscriptions per month. I am getting ver update and very scared that 
I am woundering if this states Senete even care about the disabled. 
When Former Gov XXX was in office he promised to bust up the 
Mental Health Program. Now we have this new and have had this 
Govoner for a long time. It just seems like the longer that this 
Governer and many of the state senate is in office the more the poor 
disabled and handycaped get screwed. I have read all of the 
proposed cuts and to me it just seems like all this state is wanting to 
do with people on Medicade is just have them curl up in a ball and 
DIE. It just seems that you do not care about the less fourtunate any 
more. And as for me it is not my fault that I have several disabilit ies 
that does dervent me from being able to hold down a full time job 
ever agian. I did not choose to have to be on so many medicines by 
body just has a tendance to head south and begin to shut down. I am 
asking that the senate might take a relook at this proposal and 
posibility reconsider on all of these cuts that you are proposing. I am 
very greatful for time and energy that you may be able to help the 
good citizens of this state that are Disabled and are lower class. 
 
Constituent XXX 
 
and this: 
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To: XXX 
 
I belive that the coffee shop jacquies in XXXXX should be checked 
out for wrong doing.  our boss wont let us ring up orders cause she 
doesnt want to pay the sales tax of the iteams our customers purches, 
also she hasnt been paying us employees for the hours wored. the 
most worst part is she has a tip jar an it says as well as she quotes 
that all tips made go to breast cancer.  we have raised over 9 
thousand dollars in that jar an she dumps it in to her account an then 
brags to family an us how she spent it on her self an her boys.  this 
is my last hope on trying to get thiss bussiness back on the right step. 
please help!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 
 
Constituent XXX 
 
In addition to the wide variety of quality levels that government officials receive, 
they also take in communication on many different topics. “We get mostly personal 
issues,” one legislator tells me that “A mother will call about a son or daughter with legal 
issues. A lot of calls about road issues (pot holes) or just a road that needs attention.” 
This legislator reckons that these types of casework calls account for most of the 
communication that his office receives. But, “we also get email communication about a 
certain bill that is in hearing that will be coming up for a vote soon…to voice their 
opinion.” Others seem to have the same experience. “Most of the time people want 
something, whether it is a job, or to have something fixed, or to get through some of the 
red tape…that’s actually a lot of them, they need benefits or unemployment or something 
and are having a hard time navigating the system,” reports one aide. Another says, “Our 
office gets a lot of emails about major bills that are coming up—you know, like with gay 
marriage or stuff like that, but mostly we get calls and letters asking for help with things.” 
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When asked what types of things, he answered, “a lot of stuff for welfare benefits—
people who need help or got denied but think it was a mistake, and then for jobs or 
unemployment.” 
 In addition to comprising the bulk of the communication that these offices 
receive, requests for assistance (or casework) also receive the most individual attention. 
As discussed previously, legislators spend a considerable chunk of their time on these 
cases and it is not solely because they are numerous:  
People who call or write in for help with something, it’s those people 
that if you spend a little bit more time on them that it will make the 
biggest difference. Helping someone get their unemployment check 
or child support payment, well that is a pretty big deal. People who 
are giving their opinion on a bill or on policy? Well those people 
either agree with me, which is great, or they don’t and there isn’t 
anything really that I can do to change their mind. 
 
This legislator isn’t alone in his thinking: 
 
My office definitely spends the most time with constituents who are 
asking us for help. There are a lot of people who just need a little 
information about who to contact about something, or heck, who 
just need to vent a little. If we can provide that kind of service for 
them and they walk away happy—well that’s good for both of us. 
And then they might tell their friends or their family that they had a 
good experience talking to ol’ Senator XXX’s office and then those 
people might call us. Even if we can’t help everyone, they appreciate 
that we try and then they might come out for us in the future. 
 
These quotes indicate that these legislators are savvy about how to divvy up 
their time and attention per the expectations of the Mayhew/Fenno research legacy, 
even if they are not willing to admit that some constituents receive more attention 
than others. If this is the case, it is important to examine the policy implicat ions 
involved therein. Jewell noted that, “in most districts the constituents’ interests are 
diverse and perhaps contradictory. When constituents have conflicting interests or 
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when they are sharply divided in viewpoint, it is impossible to act in the interest of, 
or to be responsive to, all of them. The larger and more diverse the district, the more 
frequently a legislator will face this dilemma” (Jewell 1982, pg. 13, see also Pitkin 
1967, p. 209). There is a considerable amount of variation in the number of 
constituents in each state legislative district in the United States. New Hampshire’s 
State House members represent just over 3000 citizens each, while Texas Senators 
represent over 800,000 and California Senators represent over 900,000 (National 
Conference of State Legislators 2010). On average, each state Senator represents 
around 154,000 and each House member represents just over 66,000. 
Though state legislative districts are much more homogeneous than U.S. 
congressional districts (Jewell 1982; Birkhead 2013), there is, nonetheless, 
variability in demographics, ideology, and policy opinions in each. Additiona lly, 
the legislators have access to, and are knowledgeable about, this information. 
Organizations such as the National Conference of State Legislators, the Center for 
American Women and Politics and the National Black Caucus of State Legisla tors 
compile information on these subjects and make it available to anyone who wants 
to access it. Further, individual states provide statistical and descriptive information 
on the districts to legislators.  
 
4.5 Perceptions of Representation 
Perhaps due in part to the availability of this type of information, the 
legislators’ connections with the communities that they represent, or maybe due to 
flat out hubris, legislators appear convinced that they are extremely knowledgeab le 
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about the people in their district and what the needs of those people are. For 
example, one legislator remarked, “I grew up in my district and have lived here 
most of my life. I feel that I have a pretty good handle on the demographic qualit ies 
of my district.” Most of the legislators who I interviewed also acknowledge that 
they have access to information about which constituents are likely voters and 
likely supporters. “The party tells us about the demographics and stuff,” says one. 
Another said, “The caucus provides us with that information and we use it when 
we send out mailings.” 
Legislators seem to be aware of the demographic variability within their 
districts, however that is not to say that this knowledge is used during the policy 
decision making process. Although reason and research both tell us that people 
within a constituency have a wide variety of interests, “fragmented and mult i-
dimensional with clusterings of issues that voters see as related” (Ingram, Laney 
and McCain 2011, p. 11), legislators presume that they do a pretty good job voting 
on policies that are congruent with their people as a whole. One legisla tor 
interviewed by Jewell said, “I can’t think of a time when I have voted contrary to 
what the district wants because I vote the way they want me to. I am a 
representative—I represent my district. Partly this is because I am really typical of 
the district, and partly because if conflicts arose I would go along with the district” 
(Jewell 1982, p. 3).  
Further, representatives seem to want to accurately represent the will of 
their constituents. One 2011 study found, using a randomized field experiment, that 
when given information about public opinion on a spending bill, state legislators in 
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New Mexico were more likely to vote in accordance with the public than those who 
were not provided the information (Butler and Nickerson 2011). This finding 
suggests that not only do legislators think that they are responsive to the people, 
they want to be. As one legislator I interviewed said, “I spend as much time as 
possible talking to the people in my district so that I get a better idea of what they 
want me to do. I get letters and calls, of course, but not everyone does that, so I try 
to get out there and do the interacting”. 
This is not to say, though, that the legislators get it right all of the time. In 
fact, evidence points to the contrary. As Jewell stated, “misperception arises when 
a legislator believes that he has an accurate perception of the full range of 
viewpoints but is actually basing his judgments on a small sample of constituents 
or misinterpreting some of the inputs that he gets from the district” (Jewell 1982, 
pgs. 85-86). 
While it is reasonable that “one would expect most representatives to 
believe themselves congruent” (Broockman and Skovron 2013, p. 20), research has 
indicated that it is more the case that elites are wishful thinkers when it comes to 
their perceptions of their constituents, overestimating support for their policies 
(Converse and Pierce 1986; Granberg and Holmberg 2002). For instance, 
Broockman and Skovron (2013) find that, “politicians consistently and 
substantially overestimate support for conservative positions among their 
constituents” (p. 3). The findings of this study hold for both liberal and conservative 
politicians and are striking—“the misperception[s are] so large that nearly half of 
sitting office holders appear to believe that they represent a district that is more 
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conservative…than the most conservative legislative district in the whole country” 
(p.4).  
One of the legislator interviews that I conducted seems to illustrate this: 
“My district is made up of good Christian Americans. We are a conservative district 
and tend toward traditional values”, they said. A bit of research into this legislato r’s 
district reveals that they are pretty much correct in their assessment. A majority of 
the district does self-identify as Republican and Christian. However, almost a 
quarter of the residents identify as Democratic and 16% as non-Christian. This 
legislator truly believes that they have an accurate picture of their district, and he 
does in the aggregate, but if there are systematic policy preference differences 
between the majority and the minority, the legislator’s perception that they are 
acting in the interest of the entire population is incorrect. 
Of course this kind of systematic misrepresentation of a constituency is not 
always unintentional—there may even be strategery13 afoot. The legislator who 
said that their district consists of white Christian Republicans might truly believe 
that—perhaps as a result of overlap in the types of places they frequent or the 
demographics of those most involved in civic life. Alternatively, because white 
Christian Republicans make up the vast majority of this particular legislato r’s 
supporters, there may be motivation present for the legislator to overestimate their 
presence in the district. 
I asked that legislator if they were aware of the characteristics of those most 
likely to vote for them. The answer was unequivocally affirmative: “the party 
                                                                 
13 The author would like to thank the writers of the NBC show, “Saturday Night Live” for coining this word 
and the Bush administration for adopting it. It is far more descriptive than its proper counterpart, “strategy”. 
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makes sure that we get the breakdown of our voters—both the local party office 
and the party leaders in our State House.” Considering this legislato r’s 
acknowledged awareness of their voting public, it seems unlikely that the 
overestimation of the demographic that comprises the bulk of their voters is 
unrelated to motivation. This is especially true in light of the research on wishful 
thinking (Converse and Pierce 1986; Granberg and Holmberg 2002; Broockman 
and Skovron 2013). For instance, Broockman and Skovron demonstrated that 
legislators believe their districts to be more conservative than they are in reality but 
also showed that this effect was stronger amongst conservative lawmakers. 
The misrepresentation of the size of groups in a constituency does not even 
necessarily serve to disenfranchise the smaller group. For instance, in 2013 a 
measure designed to expand background checks for individuals purchasing 
firearms was introduced in the United State House of Representatives. At the time 
the PEW Research Center reported that a full 85% of Americans supported the 
measure (PEW Research Center 2013). With that unusual level of support and 
considering the tragic gun-related deaths of children in Newtown, Connecticut from 
which the bill stemmed, it seemed as if passing the measure would have been a 
slam dunk. The 15% who opposed it, however, were a particularly powerful and 
vocal group—engaged and politically active—largely affiliated with the National 
Rifle Association (opensecrets.org). Many Republican representatives recognized 
this and voted against the bill. 
There is no proof, and there have thus far been no studies indicating the 
reasons why these representatives voted against the bill—Perhaps, trustee-style, 
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they were voting with their consciences. There is some evidence, though, that this 
was not the case. For instance, the organization Open Secrets (opensecrets.org), 
which tracks campaign donations, reported that there is a correlations between 
those representatives who voted against the measure and those who accepted 
campaign contributions from gun rights groups like the National Rifle Association 
(Opensecrets.org 2013). Further, the four Democrats who voted against the 
measure all hail from states where President Obama lost by wide margins in 2012. 
This indicates not only that legislators may be in the pockets of interest groups, but 
that they are acutely aware of their supporters—those who vote for them and those 
who contribute to their campaigns—even in the face of overwhelming popular 
support for the bill. The makeup of the much smaller group opposing the bill 
mattered. 
The fact that legislators are knowledgeable about who their supporters are 
and are disproportionately responsive to them does not mean that they are 
necessarily willing to acknowledge that they may be less responsive, in a policy 
sense, to other constituents. I asked each of the legislators I interviewed if they were 
aware that different groups of people had different policy interests, and their 
answers hedged the question, at best. One responded, “If the majority of my district 
wants something, it is my job to go along with that”. Another echoed this sentiment, 
“What matters to me is that I am doing what most of the people want me to do. 
People aren’t going to agree on everything, but if most of them agree, then it is 
probably the right thing to do.” 
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It occurred to me that perhaps they did not fully comprehend what I was 
asking, so I made my inquiry more specific, asking them to acknowledge that some 
policies favor people with money, white citizens, or people with more education, 
for example. Again, the legislators uniformly failed to allow for this possibility. 
One legislator was adamant that, “we are all created equally in god’s eyes” and that 
“there are no differences between people, no matter what”. Another, in a rather 
irritated manner, reminded me that “not all black people are poor”. Stymied, I 
slightly altered my line of questioning, asking if they ever found it difficult to 
legislate for different people, like the well-educated and not-so-well-educated at the 
same time. Once more, the legislators fell back on the idea that the majority of the 
district mattered the most, simply refusing to acknowledge that different people 
may have different policy interests.  
 It is possible that these legislators actually believe that there are no 
systematic differences in policy interests and that what is good for the majority is 
always the right thing to do. This seems unlikely, for as sophisticated as their 
answers were in terms of the electoral advantages of certain actions, the 
demographic makeup of their supporters, and the like, it does not seem credible that 
they would be so ignorant about policy interests.  
It is also possible that they know good and well that this is not the case, but 
feel they need to answer in a certain way for political reasons. This is a far more 
likely possibility. Although I have a personal (to varying degrees) connection to 
each of the legislators interviewed, and was very clear that their names would never 
be used in my work, it is logical to think that they may have still been concerned 
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about honest answers to the more sensitive questions leaking and making them look 
bad.  
Still another possibility relates to motivated reasoning. Motivated 
reasoning, related to the broader concept of confirmation bias, leads people to 
confirm what they already believe, while ignoring information that would disprove 
the belief (Kunda 1990; Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, and Hamann 2006). 
When people use motivated reasoning, they often respond defensively to contrary 
evidence, such as the legislators did when I asked them about group interests (recall 
that one legislator invoked God and another became quite irritated). If the 
legislators have been acting as if the interests of the majority are the pinnacle of 
representational importance to the exclusion other groups, it is possible that they 
have basically talked themselves into thinking that it is true. Obviously, legisla tor 
motivation is not the focus of this dissertation and I have not tested for any of these 
possibilities directly, however the cognitive dissonance present in these answers 
indicate that this is an area ripe for future research. 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 Casework, responding to inquiries and requests made by constituents, is 
clearly an important part of a legislator’s job. Not only do constituents expect it, 
legislators understand that responding to their citizens in this way confers benefits 
at the ballot box. This finding is in line with Carl Friedrich’s “rule of anticipated 
reactions” (Friedrich 1946, pp. 589-591). By this, Friedrich meant that because 
legislators aim to be reelected they act in a manner that they expect will lead to 
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future votes. Because legislators believe that performing casework is electorally 
beneficial (Rosenthal 1993; Freeman and Richardson 1996; Ellickson and Whistler 
2001), it is logical that they spend a considerable amount of time on it, and they are 
certainly willing to acknowledge this. And because legislators know who the likely 
voters are (people with higher education levels, for example) within his or her 
constituency, it is also logical that they will spend more time being responsive to 
those voters, even at the expense of other constituents (as we saw in Chapter 2). 
The fact, then, that these same legislators uniformly deny that they use this 
information when it comes to prioritizing attention and time, responding to 
communication, and formulating and voting on policy, seems particula r ly 
implausible. This is especially true in light of the results in Chapters 2 and 3 of this 
dissertation—clearly individuals with less education are being given less attention 
than their better-educated counterparts. Thus, it appears that legislators, as politica l 
figures, may simply be lying, either to me or to themselves, about how they devote 
their time and resources. 
As troubling as the idea of untruthful politicians is, there is another possible 
explanation. It is conceivable that the six legislators who I interviewed are truly 
unaware that there are distinct groups of people with distinct policy interests that 
are different from the interests of the majority (or the vocal, voting majority).  
While the former is disconcerting because it means that elected officials are 
willfully misrepresenting segments of the population, the latter means that these 
officials are ignorant about their constituencies and the connections between 
people’s interests and policy outcomes. While there is research that may indicate 
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that ignorance is at play (Butler and Nickerson 2011), there is certainly room for 
further research in this area. 
Summarily, though the legislators in my small sample categorically reject 
the notion that there are any systematic representation differences based on 
education, their responses, combined with the evidence from Chapters 2 and 3 tell 
a different story. First, the assumptions that I had made about communica t ion 
quality and content in Chapter 2 are clearly realistic. Samples of real emails 
demonstrate that there is a wide variety of communication reaching the legisla tors 
on a regular basis. Further, the legislators acknowledge the quality and content 
difference and seem to make assumptions about the writers. This combined with 
the fact that the legislators clearly have a good sense of their likely voters serves to 
provide further evidence that legislators do, in fact, systematically underrepresent 
against constituents with low educational attainment. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, I set out to answer one primary question: how responsive are 
elected officials to the interests of less educated voters? Using two quantitative and one 
qualitative approaches to assessing political representation, my answer to this question is, 
unfortunately, not very. Citizens with lower relative levels of education, defined as those 
with no high school degree, are less likely to receive responses to their inquiries, are less 
likely to have their needs met by policy, and are not even acknowledged to have different 
interests and needs by their elected representatives. This finding, while certainly a 
normative downer, is not entirely surprising, as research has shown time and again that 
diminished resources and voting participation translate into unequal political outcomes 
(Gilens 2005; Jacobs and Page 2005; Bartels 2008; Rigby and Wright 2010).  
 In this concluding chapter, I have three goals. First, I revisit education as the 
primary variable of interest, assessing the reasons it may have been overlooked in the 
research on representation and arguing for its importance. Next, I review my main 
empirical findings. I situate the findings in the extant literature on representation and 
“unequal democracy”, discussing how my findings relate to, and build upon, previous 
scholarly work in these areas. Finally, I discuss the possible policy implications that can 
be derived from the empirical findings from this dissertation. There are indications that 
political inequality as it relates to education is something that can be improved—from 
both the constituents’ and the lawmakers’ sides. I thus argue that the results I found 
herein not only advance our scholarly understanding of political inequality, but also 
readily suggest policy reforms that might help to bring about a more equal policymaking 
process.   
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5.1: Revisiting Education 
The fact that the less educated are less politically active than the better educated is 
well documented amongst those who study participation. Beginning with the research of 
Almond and Verba (1963), it has been demonstrated repeatedly that educational 
attainment influences the political interest and participation of individual citizens. Philip 
Converse (1972), went so far as to claim that education is the cure for the “puzzle of 
political participation” (p. 324). Researchers have suggested that education increases 
participation in a variety of ways, such as through the increase in cognitive skills and 
political information (Campbell et al. 1960; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Rosenberg 
1988), the development of civic engagement skills (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba 
et al. 1995), and the development of political interest (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  
Education has also been explored as a possible proxy variable for things like 
childhood experience (Kam and Palmer 2007), family background (Coleman et al. 1966; 
Tenn 2007), age (Nie et al. 1996) or income (Parry et al. 1992). When compared to 
highly educated individuals, those with less education are more likely to come from low 
income families with parents who are less involved in cultural and political activities 
(Greenstein 1965; Pye 1962; Hess and Torney 2005). It has been posited (see Kam and 
Palmer 2007) that if those factors are controlled for, education has no independent effect 
on participation.  More recent research, however, has shown that statistical models that 
properly correct for the selection bias inherent in educational attainment do, in fact, 
indicate a causal relationship between education and political participation: 
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“postsecondary educational advancement has a positive and substantively important 
causal effect on political participation” (Mayer 2011, p. 644). 
It is precisely because of the complex nature of the relationship between 
education and participation that it is of particular interest for this research. Because 
education is held disproportionately by socioeconomic elites and because it confers the 
skills and knowledge necessary for participation, the connection to participation, and 
ultimately to representation is tenable. Though education is related to income, it also 
includes a shared experience and set of skills that magnify the simple socioeconomic 
effects.  
 Despite all of this, education does not get as much attention in the participation 
literature as income, gender, and race, and practically none at all in the representation 
literature. One of the reasons for this may be that groups of people with similar education 
levels do not tend to organize around their political interests. Groups organize on the 
basis of gender, religion, race, and ethnicity (Verba et al. 1995), but education-based 
groups have not mobilized as a defined cohort with clear shared interests, demanding 
particular rights or improved station. This is true even though there are distinct policy 
outcomes that disproportionally affect people of differing educational attainment. This is 
not to say that education is not discussed as it relates to sociopolitical issues, however it 
is largely thought of as a tool to improve the standing of otherwise defined groups that 
are disadvantaged in other ways (race, income, etc.).  
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5.2 The Participation and Representation Gaps 
 Much attention has been paid recently to an article concluding that “economic 
elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent 
impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average 
citizens have little or no independent influence” (Gilens and Page 2014, p. 3). In line with 
previous research on the topic (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Jacobs and Page 2005; Rigby 
and Wright 2010), the authors find that the preferences of lower and middle-class 
Americans had little to no effect on policy outcomes, while the preferences of rich 
Americans were indicated to be fifteen times more influential. Further, while they find 
that “mass-based interest groups” do have an effect on policy, the interests of these 
groups are only roughly half as influential as business-based groups. Similarly, a recent 
field experiment from Joseph Kalla and David Broockman focuses on how individuals 
gain access to members of Congress. They found that when constituents identify 
themselves as donors, they were almost four times more likely to successfully schedule a 
meeting with the congressperson or a high-level staffer.  
 There is evidence that this responsiveness differential may stem, at least partially, 
from a participation gap between high and low income individuals (Butler and 
Broockman 2011; Verba et al. 1995; Hill and Leighley 1992; Hill et al. 1995; Campbell 
2003; Martin 2003). Those citizens with lower socioeconomic levels are less likely to 
have the resources (like money and time) that increase civic participation, and thus, do 
not vote at rates as high as those with higher incomes. This is also true for individuals 
with lower education levels. There is a correlation between education and income such 
that individuals with lower educational attainment tend to make less money and have less 
121 
 
 
 
free time. Further, education confers skills and interests that are valuable resources for 
participation, and those individuals who lack these skills and who also lack money and 
free time are the least likely to vote. And, those who are the least likely to vote are the 
least likely to be appropriately represented by their government. As V.O. Key put it, “the 
blunt truth is that politicians and officials are under no compulsion to pay much heed to 
classes and groups of citizens that do not vote” (Key 1949, p. 99). 
 The three studies in Chapter 2 clearly demonstrate this pattern—when a 
“constituent” with a high implied or stated education level contacted his legislator, he 
was far more likely to get a response then when the same contact was made by someone 
with less education. Response rates to the educated constituents varied from 62% to 80%, 
while response to the less-educated varied from 45% to 60%. Considering the low 
response rate to the less-educated constituent it is feasible that statistical discrimination 
may be at work—less educated people are less likely to turn out on Election Day, so they 
become a lower priority for busy legislators. 
 Similarly, in Chapter 3 I found that in addition to less-educated constituents not 
receiving fair service responsiveness, they are also not being appropriately represented in 
terms of policy. I examined two policy areas in which individuals with lower relative 
educational attainment are disproportionately likely to be affected, Medicaid spending 
and minimum wage, finding that an increase in the proportion of a state’s population with 
low education levels (adults without a high school diploma) does not predict an increase 
in Medicaid spending or the minimum wage. Legislators are simply not particularly 
responsive to the needs of citizens with low levels of education. 
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 I had hypothesized that education would work similarly to race and gender, and 
that perhaps the presence of legislators with lower relative levels of education themselves 
(no college experience, as there are not, to my knowledge, any state legislators who did 
not graduate high school at this time) might serve to increase the representation of less-
educated constituents. Phillips (1995) argued that shared experiences and empathy would 
lead individuals in leadership positions to be more sensitive to the concerns of 
historically disadvantaged or underrepresented groups to which they also belong. Though 
she was specifically studying gendered experiences and descriptive representation, she 
posited that the same principle could be transferred to other groups. In that education, or 
the lack thereof, bestows shared experiences, I expected to find similar results for 
education representation. I did not, however, find this in my data in either Chapter 2 or in 
Chapter 3.  In none of the three studies Chapter 2 do legislator education levels appear to 
significantly predict differential responsiveness, and legislator education predicts 
Medicaid spending and minimum wage in the opposite direction than what I had 
expected. 
As I had discussed in Chapter 1, there is perhaps an easy explanation for this. 
There are individual characteristics that incite entitativity, or group cohesiveness, (race 
and religion, for example), but there are other characteristics that are simply seen as 
individual problems. Education may, in fact, be one of these. People who drop out of 
school prior to high school graduation may see themselves as alone in their situation, not 
necessarily similar to others who did the same. Likewise, those who do not continue to 
post-secondary education but who succeed professionally, such as in becoming a state 
legislator, also may not see themselves as similar to others with the same educational 
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background. If this is the case, it is illogical to expect that we would see the same kind of 
descriptive representation effects that we see in studies of race or gender. 
 
5.3: Implications: Education and Representation 
 Those who vote and those who represent are more educated than those who do 
not, but is that really such a bad thing? What is so appalling about well-educated people 
having a disproportionate amount of political influence? Some might even argue that it is 
encouraging that our representatives and leaders have had such a solid academic 
grounding and that is so dominant in the formulation of policy (Zakaria 2003). Further, 
the fact that those who are politically involved do not match the rest of the country in 
important demographic characteristics does not necessarily mean that substantive 
representation of the needs and interests of the whole country is not occurring. Elected 
officials and political activists may not share the same characteristics as the rest of the 
constituents, but that does not necessarily mean that they do not “act in the interest of the 
represented, in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin 1967, p. 209).  
Of course, an education disparity is not necessarily a problem, especially in light 
of my finding that state legislators with lower levels of education themselves (no 
education past high school) do not better represent the interests of less-educated 
constituents. However, representing a large group of people (over 317,000,000 at present) 
is hard. Representation becomes even more difficult when there is a discernable gap in 
policy preferences between active and inactive citizens, that is, when “those in public life 
are more likely to be aware of and to pay attention to the needs or preferences of those 
who are active” (Verba et al. 1995, p.163). This raises the question of whether more 
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highly educated citizens differ from lesser-educated citizens in terms of their policy 
preferences and interests. In Chapter 3, I argued that minimum wage policy and 
healthcare spending disproportionately affect individuals with less education—policy 
areas that disproportionately affect the interests of those with less education. Similarly, a 
1972 study by Cobb and Elder found that study participants in the Netherlands answered 
questions about the most important problems facing society similarly in terms of the top 
five most important problems, but outside of the top five, there were large differences 
based on educational attainment. For example, the well-educated are concerned with 
ethics, the environment, and education, while those with lower levels of education are 
less likely to see these things as serious problems. 
In Chapter 4, I found that the legislators who I interviewed seemed primarily 
concerned with the will of the majority in their districts—exactly the expectation 
stemming from the Verba et al. quote above. Broadly, this finding, along with the 
findings in Chapters 2 and 3, raises the issue of de Toqueville’s “tyranny of the 
majority”—when the majority of the population subordinates the minority. This is then 
magnified, when the minority is a discrete group with particular needs and interests. By 
pushing aside those with less education, the state legislators are systematically 
disenfranchising a group of people who are most likely, because of correlations with 
poverty, unemployment, and the like, to need government services. 
 Of course, it is reasonable to expect that government officials will—or even 
should—legislate based on the wishes of the majority. This is not necessarily a bad thing, 
and is likely even a good thing most of the time. The problem lies in the conflict between 
majority rule and minority interests. Concern about the potential tyranny of the majority 
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dates back to the founding of America and was felt by Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
alike. Majority rule is clearly necessary for the function of a participatory democracy, but 
what of the minority? There are safeguards in place to protect some minority rights, 
namely the enumerated rights in the Constitution, as well as the protection afforded by 
the justice system, however when it comes to interests, rather than rights, the minority 
tends to be in a more precarious position. It falls to the voters to elect officials who will, 
while legislating for the majority much of the time, also make an attempt to legislate for 
the needs and interests of minority groups. Unfortunately, when many minority groups, 
including those with lower education levels, do not turn out to vote in high numbers it is 
difficult to accomplish this effectively. 
 
 
5.4: Recommendations: Education and the Civic Mission of 
Schools 
 In response to the (real or perceived) decline in political participation over the 
years, much attention has been paid to the role of civic education in schools. Citing 
statistics about participation in civic and political institutions, as well as those regarding 
the notion that young people are less likely to vote, have lower levels of political interest, 
or participate less frequently in political discussions than older Americans, organizations 
and commentators have argued for a renewed focus on the civic mission of schools. The 
list of related organizations that have cropped up in the past 40 years is substantial: the 
Center for Civic Education, the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning 
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and Engagement, the Center for Civic Literacy, the Campaign for the Civic Mission of 
Schools, and Sandra Day O’Connor’s iCivics are some of the more prominent examples, 
but this list is certainly not exhaustive. A civics test has even been developed as part of 
the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) evaluations.  
 The idea behind this movement is that civic education will help America’s youth 
“acquire and learn to use skills, knowledge, and attitudes that will prepare them to be 
competent and responsible citizens throughout their lives” (NCSL 2014). This idea is not 
without scholarly support. There is research that suggests that youth who receive civic 
education during their K-12 school years are more likely to vote than their peers who did 
not receive similar schooling (CIRCLE and NCSL). Niemi and Junn (1998) found that 
civic education courses lead to “increased civic knowledge to a substantial degree above 
and beyond individual motivation and family-socialization influences” (Niemi and Junn 
1998, p. 148). Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) also find that an increase in civic 
knowledge can have a large impact on engagement and participation.  
  In that knowledge is one of the Verba-esque resources that affect political 
participation, civic education is certainly a logical way to increase participation in 
politics. There are a couple of problems with this strategy, however. First, students may 
not be absorbing as much information on civics and government as one might hope. To 
wit, only about one-quarter of students in fourth, eighth, and twelfth grades score at or 
above “proficient” on the NAEP assessment (CIRCLE). Since No Child Left Behind was 
passed in 1996, the amount of time that schools have available to schedule courses that 
are not primarily focused on reading and math has decreased. Teachers are simply unable 
to dedicate the time necessary to ensure that students are receiving enough civic 
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instruction to make a difference. 
The second problem, and the one most relevant to this dissertation, is a matter of 
putting the proverbial cart before the horse. In Chapter 2 I demonstrated that state 
legislators are considerably more responsive to communication received that had been 
written at a relatively high level—that is to say, with no spelling or grammatical 
mistakes. Being able to write well, however, is not as common as it should be. According 
to the National Commission on Writing (2013), the following NAEP writing samples 
may be considered typical of current writing by high school students. Students were 
asked to explain “Appleby”, a local haunted house. Below are three representative pieces 
submitted about the Appleby House. Each is a complete, unedited response to the 
exercise. The Appleby exercise provided students with basic information about the house 
and asked them to write an explanatory article about it. 
 
Rating: Unsatisfactory (48% of respondents) 
The house with no windows. This is a house with dead-end hallways, 36 rooms 
and stairs leading to the cieling [sic]. Doorways go nowhere and all this to confuse 
ghosts. 
Rating: Adequate (50% of respondents) 
Man builds strange house to scare ghosts. He says that he did it to confuse the 
ghosts. But why may we ask would he want to spend 10 years building a house. For 
instance there are stairs that go nowhere and hallways that go nowhere. This house has 36 
rooms. If you ask me I think it is kind of strange.  
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Rating: Elaborated (2% of respondents) 
Years of rumors and unsubstantiated reports have created, in a quite urban 
neighborhood, a house of horrors. The dwelling is one Appleby House, a modest 
dwelling of 36 rooms built over an 8 year period. On interviewing neighbors, who 
dubbed the owner “strange” one finds that 10 carpenters have been employed to build 
such oddities as stairways to ceilings, windows on blank walls, and doorways going 
nowhere. According to these reports, these bizarre customizings are intended to confuse 
ghosts. Maybe the owner will report one day that he has caught one in a dead end 
hallway! Until then, however, the mystery of the building of Appleby House remains just 
that—a mystery.   
 
If writing skills make such a big difference in the responsiveness that comes from 
elected officials, perhaps it would behoove us—including the organizations dedicated to 
civic education, and the government entities that fund these organizations—to focus more 
on the basics, writing and communicating a message, rather than leaping forward to 
specific knowledge. 
 
5.5: Conclusion 
 This dissertation builds on previous studies of political representation in the 
American states by assessing inequalities in the democratic process. These findings, 
when combined with the literature on inequality, educational attainment, and 
representation help us to better understand why political influence is unequal in the 
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American states. Democracy rests on the fundamental ideal of the equal consideration of 
the needs and preferences of each citizen. Political participation is the mechanism by 
which those needs and preferences are communicated to political decision makers and by 
which pressure is brought to bear on them to respond. Thus, equality in political 
participation - embodied in the most obvious principle of equal consideration of citizen 
preferences, one-person, one-vote - would seem to be a necessary condition for 
democracy. Unequal participation suggests that elected officials respond to a biased 
representation of the public. If educational advancement increases political participation, 
then we have not only identified a source of participatory inequalities, but also a potential 
corrective. After all, as Marx (1847) astutely noted, "The interest which any individual 
has in society is in inverse proportion to the interest which society has in him". 
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